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Note
Reading Between the Lines of Electronic Health
Records: The Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act and Its Implications
for Health Care Fraud and Information Security
JOSEPH D. SZEREJKO

The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act, which Congress passed as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, has set in motion
a widespread increase in the use of electronic health records (EHRs)
across the American health care industry. While EHRs are not new
to health care, their being the standard format for purposes of
documenting patients’ health records across the United States is a
modern reality. By monetarily rewarding health care providers for
adopting and using EHRs and by penalizing noncompliant
providers, the HITECH Act seeks to achieve this reality through its
meaningful use incentive program.
This Note examines the ways in which widespread use of EHRs
in the American health care industry will impact the security and
privacy of protected health information. Furthermore, this Note
predicts how the proliferation of EHRs may complicate, and in some
cases obstruct, health care fraud detection. In this vein, this Note
assesses the tactical options available to anti-fraud authorities as
they adapt their auditing, detection, and enforcement efforts to an
electronic world. Finally, this Note offers recommendations as to
how prosecutors, law enforcement authorities, lawmakers,
providers, and patients can improve health care fraud detection.
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Reading Between the Lines of Electronic Health
Records: The Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act and Its Implications
for Health Care Fraud and Information Security
JOSEPH D. SZEREJKO
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an understatement to say that technology has influenced health
care’s development over the past several decades. For example, diabetes
patients can monitor their insulin levels with a transdermal patch,1
radiologists in India can read an American patient’s X-rays at the click of a
mouse,2 and surgeons can operate on patients with robots.3 Technology
constantly improves the quality of health care and medical research, but it
also influences the law. Accordingly, legal practitioners, legislators, and
health care providers should monitor technological health care
developments every step of the way, for they have rippling effects.
The proliferation of electronic health records (EHRs)4 is a major trend
in health information technology5 that has impacted—and will continue to

J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, Class of 2015. I would like to thank
everyone at the United States Attorney’s Office in Hartford for providing me with valuable insight and
guidance with respect to prosecuting health care fraud. Further, I would like to thank Special Assistant
United States Attorney Michael Ahern and Michael Cohen, Inspector at the United States Department
of Health and Human Services for sparking my interest in the issues encompassed in this Note. I would
also like to thank Adjunct Professor Joshua Stein from the University of Connecticut School of Law for
sharing his thoughts with me on the privacy and security of EHRs. I would also like to thank my
friends and family for supporting me throughout my writing this Note. Finally, I would especially like
to thank the editors of Volumes 46 and 47 of the Connecticut Law Review for their help in preparing
my Note for publication. This Note would not have been possible without their valuable efforts and
recommendations.
1
See, e.g., What is V-Go?, V-GO, https://www.go-vgo.com/what-is-vgo (last visited Jan. 28,
2015) (describing a transdermal patch that monitors and delivers insulin for diabetes patients).
2
See, e.g., James Brice, Globalization Comes to Radiology: Global Nighthawks Thrive While
Outsourcers Hire Foreign-Trained Radiologists to Read for U.S. Imaging Practices, DIAGNOSTIC
IMAGING.COM (Nov. 2003), http://web.mit.edu/outsourcing/class1/DI-radiology-1.htm (describing a
doctor’s routine practice of performing radiological diagnoses in Bangalore, India for patients in
Atlanta, Georgia).
3
See, e.g., The Da Vinci Surgical System, INTUITIVE SURGICAL, http://www.intuitivesurgical.com
/products/davinci_surgical_system/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (describing the da Vinci surgical robot, a
pioneering piece of machinery in the field of robotic surgery).
4
The legislative, medical, legal, and academic materials discussing this topic occasionally refer to
these records as electronic medical records (EMRs). This Note will refer to them as EHRs.
5
See David Blumenthal, Launching HITECH, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 382, 382 (2010) (describing
how installation and use of EHRs is an integral part of using health information technology).
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impact—the intertwined medical and legal fields in the twenty-first
century. EHRs streamline the provision of health care, make patients’ care
more comprehensive, and put providers on equal footing from an
informational perspective.6 For instance, if paramedics in Los Angeles roll
an unconscious vacationing New Yorker into Cedars-Sinai’s Emergency
Room after he has suffered a stroke, EHR technology permits attending ER
physicians—after having looked at the patient’s identification—to look up
the patient’s medical history and other personal health information at the
click of a mouse.7 On the other hand, a hospital employee with bad
intentions can access an EHR database and use patients’ confidential
proprietary information for theft and other criminal purposes.8 Therein lies
the rub: great technological innovations that facilitate saving lives also
provide criminals with tools for their respective trade.
EHR technology enhances the speed and efficacy of medicine and
many providers have integrated EHR systems into their practices for these
very reasons. However, while the federal government is able to cite a
plethora of practical justifications for implementing a nationwide EHR
system, there is also cause for concern. There are various reasons why
many providers have not yet implemented EHR technology into their
business models, but the primary reason that abstaining providers articulate
is that implementation is too costly.9 In the first decade of the twenty-first
century, health care providers in the United States, particularly smaller,
private physician practices, were reluctant to launch EHR databases for

6
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-481, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS:
FIRST YEAR OF CMS’S INCENTIVE PROGRAMS SHOWS OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE PROCESSES TO
VERIFY PROVIDERS MET REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012) (“EHRs can be used . . . to electronically collect,
store, retrieve, and transfer clinical information related to patients’ care, allowing ready access to this
information by multiple providers in different locations”); but see Spencer S. Jones et al., Electronic
Health Record Adoption and Quality Improvement in U.S. Hospitals, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE SP 64,
SP 64 (2010) (offering a key finding that U.S. hospitals’ adoption of more advanced EHR systems
actually was associated with decreases in quality improvement for treatment of heart patients).
7
See, e.g., Gregory A. Wilson et al., The Effect of Immediate Access to a Computerized Medical
Record on Physician Test Ordering: A Controlled Clinical Trial in the Emergency Room, 72 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 698, 702 (1982) (suggesting that the patients who benefit most from treating doctors’
decision-making are those who have pre-existing medical records in computerized format at the time of
treatment decisions).
8
See, e.g., Erica Meltzer, Nurse Faces 51 Counts of Medical Records, ID Theft at Boulder
Community Hospital, COLORADODAILY.COM (Sept. 27, 2011, 5:16 PM), http://www.coloradodaily
.com/ci_18989489?source=most_viewed#axzz1ZFlRjK2P (reporting the story of a nurse who, while
working for a nurse staffing agency in the Denver metro area, improperly accessed over a hundred
patient medical records and used identity information to purchase credit cards and make other
purchases).
9
See Michael McBride, Measuring EHR Pain Points: High Cost, Poor Functionality Outweigh
Benefits, Ease of Access, MED. ECON. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/
medical-economics/content/tags/ehr/measuring-ehr-pain-points-high-cost-poor-functionality-outweighb?page=full (discussing how many physicians complain about the high costs associated with
implementing and using EHRs).
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their patient files. In order to install and use EHR technology, providers
must shoulder the substantial costs of maintenance, training, and support
for EHR databases in addition to the costs of purchasing and installing
them.11 Providers’ reluctance in implementing EHR technology seems
more justifiable in this light. Nevertheless, the federal government and
various state governments have started to tackle providers’ reluctance in
the interest of bringing the benefits of EHR technology to fruition.12
On February 17, 2009, as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009,13 Congress passed the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act).14 The
ultimate goal of the HITECH Act is to induce health care providers across
the nation to “meaningfully use” EHR technology for all of their patients’
medical records.15 Among other legislative objectives, the HITECH Act
provides incentive payments to clinicians and hospitals that implement and
“meaningfully use” EHR technology.16 Further, the Act enforces standard
EHR requirements and aims to incentivize nearly all covered health care
entities to adopt EHR technology by 2019.17 In essence, the Act’s
“meaningful use” program conditions clinicians’ receipt of incentive
payments on their employment of EHR technology in such a way that

10
In 2006, the Healthcare Information Management Systems Society interviewed 2,500 physician
offices around the United States and found that all of them had a practice management system.
However, when the interviewers asked the offices if they had an EHR system, only 26% of them
answered in the affirmative. Further, when the interviewers asked the other 74% of the offices if they
planned on purchasing EHR technology in the next two years, the predominant answer was no. Can
Small Healthcare Groups Feasibly Adopt Electronic Medical Records Technology?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 109th Cong. 6
(2006) (statement of Jack Price, Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, HIMSS
Analytics).
11
Id. at 7.
12
See John Rancourt & Fadesola Adetosoye, EHR Adoption Encouraged by State Meaningful Use
Acceleration Challenge 2.0, HEALTHIT BUZZ (Apr. 3, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.healthit.gov/buzzblog/meaningful-use/ehr-adoption-encouraged-state-meaningful-acceleration-challenge-20/ (“Last year,
ONC, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and our partners in the states stepped on
[the] gas pedal of Meaningful Use Acceleration—our catch-all phrase for all efforts related to bringing
down costs and improving health care quality through EHR adoption and meeting Meaningful Use
criteria.”).
13
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
14
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
15
David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electronic
Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010).
16
Mark Faccenda & Lara Parkin, Meaningful Use – What Does it Mean to You?, 23 HEALTH
LAW. 10, 10 (2011).
17
See Whitepaper: A Summary of the HITECH Act, ATHENAHEALTH, INC. 2 (Mar. 2009),
http://www.athenahealth.com/_doc/pdf/HITECH_Fact_Sheet_Whitepaper.pdf (“Prior to the HITECH
Act, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) anticipated that under existing laws, 65% of physicians
would have adopted an EHR by 2019. It now estimates that the incentive mechanisms of the HITECH
Act will boost these adoption rates to 90% of physicians.”).
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benefits their patients and health care in general. Specifically, the
HITECH Act makes as much as $27 billion in incentive payments
available over ten years, and makes as much as $44,000 through Medicare
and $63,750 through Medicaid available to each clinician.19
Some of the major difficulties that have already arisen—and that likely
will become more pronounced—include: the widespread costs that
clinicians have been forced to bear in preparing to comply with the
mandate; the transformed availability of patients’ protected health
information in cyber media; and the difficulties that EHR technology will
create for detecting health care fraud.20 Other issues likely will arise as
EHRs become increasingly prevalent.
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it seeks to evaluate several
major impacts that the HITECH Act’s EHR agenda will have on the
privacy and security of protected health information under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).21 Second,
this Note seeks to examine the difficulties that the proliferation of EHRs
will create for prosecutors in detecting health care fraud and recommends
how responsible authorities should respond to these difficulties. Part II
begins with a description of the HITECH Act’s EHR agenda, particularly
with respect to its incentive payment program and its promulgation of
meaningful use requirements. Further, Part II evaluates the HITECH Act’s
modifications to HIPAA, including its inclusion of business associates as
liable entities22 and its establishment of the data breach notification law.23
Part III begins by discussing the False Claims Act24 and federal criminal
statutes that penalize health care fraud. It then assesses how the HITECH
Act’s meaningful use program, EHR incentive program, and its
modifications to HIPAA will alter prosecutorial efforts to detect health
care fraud. Part IV makes preliminary recommendations to prosecutors,
legislators, and administrative officials regarding the difficulties that EHRs
create for detecting health care fraud. This Note concludes by recognizing
18
See Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 15, at 501–03 (discussing the meaningful use core and
menu objectives and noting how they progressively encourage usage of EHRs to improve clinical
outcomes).
19
Id. at 501.
20
See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and
Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 119–24 (2008) (discussing
the increases in potential for data errors, risk of security breach, and economic cost associated with
integration of EHR systems).
21
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–
164.318 (2013) (providing the HIPAA Security Rule); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2013)
(providing the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
22
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(a)(1)–(4).
23
42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012).
24
False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1621 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729–3733 (2012)).
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the substantial benefits of EHR technology and by making predictions
about the future of EHRs under the current regulatory regime.
II. THE HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC AND
CLINICAL HEALTH ACT AND THE SPREAD OF
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS
A. The Electronic Health Record Incentive Payment Program
The HITECH Act’s incentive payment program aims to promote the
widespread use of EHR technology across the American health care
industry by providing carrots for those professionals and hospitals that
shoulder the onerous burdens associated with implementing and using this
technology.25 One of the primary means by which the HITECH Act
achieves this overarching goal is its grant of permission to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services to provide incentive payments to
Medicare-eligible professionals, hospitals, and critical access hospitals26
that “demonstrate meaningful use of certified EHR technology.”27 The
HITECH Act also sets forth a similar Medicaid EHR incentive program.28
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services propound that the
incentive program is not simply a reimbursement system for purchasing
EHR technology, and they stress that payments are conditioned upon use.29
Thus, these payments are spoils that must go to the victors—those
Medicare- and Medicaid-eligible professionals, hospitals, and critical
access hospitals that succeed in meeting the Act’s EHR use requirements.
The HITECH Act also established the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (National Coordinator),

25

See Nitin Chhoda, HITECH Act Explained, EMR NEWS: DUMBED DOWN EMR (July 9, 2012),
http://www.emrnews.com/the-hitech-act/ (“Most of the incentives focus on promoting the use of
electronic medical records and electronic health records. Because electronic records cut down on long
term costs, but require an initial investment that many clinics don’t want to make, ARRA and the
HITECH Act offer financial benefits if you make the switch.”).
26
The Social Security Act provides, inter alia, that a State may designate a health care facility as
a critical access hospital if it is in a statutorily-defined rural area, is at least thirty-five miles away from
any other hospital, makes 24-hour emergency care services available, and provides no more than
twenty-five acute care inpatient beds. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(c)(2)(B) (2012).
27
EHR Incentive Programs, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legis
lation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html?redirect=/EHRIncentivePrograms/ (last updated Apr. 2,
2015, 4:02 PM) [hereinafter EHR Incentive Programs].
28
Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Basics.html (last updated Feb. 18,
2015, 2:45 PM) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics]. The Medicare
Incentive Program launched in 2011, so payments to participants who started then will continue
annually until 2016. Participants can begin the program after 2011, at which point a participant’s fiveyear continuous payment plan starts accumulating. However, the last year to begin is 2014. Participants
who begin the program in 2014 will finish receiving incentive payments in 2019. Id.
29
EHR Incentive Programs, supra note 27.
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which is an office within the Department of Health and Human Services.30
The National Coordinator is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the
EHR meaningful use requirements promulgated by the Health Information
Technology Standards Committee (Standards Committee),31 coordinating
health information technology efforts between Executive Branch
departments and the Department of Health and Human Services, and
updating the Federal Health IT Strategic Plan32 to include specific
benchmarks and metrics.33 The Standards Committee’s standards and
certification specifications provide a basic framework that every EHR
system should have, such that eligible professionals and hospitals using
EHR technology have a reference point with which to compare their own
EHR systems.34 The HITECH Act also established the Health Information
Technology Policy Committee (Policy Committee), which is primarily
responsible for making policy recommendations to the National
Coordinator regarding the policy issues surrounding EHR technology.35
30

42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11(a) (2012).
This Committee, comprised of health care providers, researchers, technology vendors,
purchasers, health plans, consumers, and health care employees, is primarily responsible for testing—
with the assistance of other federal agencies such as the National Institute for Standards and
Technology—certain standards and certification specifications for implementing coordinated EHR
technology. Further, this Committee must ultimately recommend these standards to the National
Coordinator. See id. § 300jj-13 (providing for the establishment, duties, membership, and operations of
the Standards Committee).
32
The National Coordinator released the Federal Health IT Strategic Plan in 2008 at the behest of
President George W. Bush’s 2004 Executive Order calling for the development and implementation of
a more robust health information technology infrastructure in the U.S. From a general perspective, the
2008 Plan sought, inter alia, to encourage more widespread use of electronic health information and to
make such use more coordinated amongst providers and patients, such that provision of care became
more efficient and successful. See The ONC-Coordinated Federal Health Information Technology
Strategic Plan: 2008-2012: Synopsis, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 1–3 (June 3, 2008),
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/hit-strategic-plan-summary-508-2.pdf
(explaining
the
National Coordinator’s organization and its dual-purpose agenda of implementing and promoting EHR
technology standards across the nation that will improve patient-focused health care, biomedical
research, public health, and emergency preparedness).
33
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj-11(c)(3)(A)(i)–(viii) (2012) (setting forth numerous objectives that the
National Coordinator is responsible for accomplishing in its efforts, such as establishing security
safeguards for protecting electronic health information, making the use of health information
technology more conducive to positive health outcomes, and making health information technology
more user-friendly).
34
See, e.g., Health IT Standards Committee: Recommendations to the National Coordinator for
Health IT, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/facas/health-it-standards-committee/health-itstandards-committee-recommendations-national-coordinator (last updated Apr. 2, 2015) (providing the
Standards Committee’s propounded recommendations for health information technology standards).
35
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-12(b)(2)(B) (2012) provides:
31

[T]he HIT Policy Committee shall make recommendations for at least the following
areas:
(i) Technologies that protect the privacy of health information and promote security
in a qualified electronic health record, including for the segmentation and protection
from disclosure of specific and sensitive individually identifiable health information
with the goal of minimizing the reluctance of patients to seek care (or disclose
information about a condition) because of privacy concerns . . . and for the use and
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Specifically, the HITECH Act tasks the Policy Committee with setting
forth official standards as to how providers should document and exchange
patients’ “individually identifiable health information.”36
As set forth in the Act, the Policy Committee, Standards Committee,
and National Coordinator premise these standards and certification criteria
on the objective of realizing the health care benefits associated with
widespread use of EHRs.37 The primary benefits of widespread
implementation and employment of EHR technology include providing
physicians with more comprehensive and accurate patient information,
fostering improved coordination among different providers who treat the
same patient, and promoting increased patient discretion in controlling
their own records.38 The HITECH Act’s incentive payments, along with
the benefits accompanying widespread implementation of EHRs,
disclosure of limited data sets of such information. (ii) A nationwide health
information technology infrastructure that allows for the electronic use and accurate
exchange of health information. (iii) The utilization of a certified electronic health
record for each person in the United States by 2014. (iv) Technologies that as a part
of a qualified electronic health record allow for an accounting of disclosures made
by a covered entity . . . for purposes of treatment, payment, and health care
operations . . . . (v) The use of certified electronic health records to improve the
quality of health care, such as by promoting the coordination of health care and
improving continuity of health care among health care providers, by reducing
medical errors, by improving population health, by reducing health disparities, by
reducing chronic disease, and by advancing research and education. (vi)
Technologies that allow individually identifiable health information to be rendered
unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals when such
information is transmitted in the nationwide health information network or
physically transported outside of the secured, physical perimeter of a health care
provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse. (vii) The use of electronic
systems to ensure the comprehensive collection of patient demographic data,
including, at a minimum, race, ethnicity, primary language, and gender information.
(viii) Technologies that address the needs of children and other vulnerable
populations.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj-12(b)(2)(B)(i)–(viii) (2012).
36
See id. § 300jj-12(b)(2)(A) (“The . . . Policy Committee shall recommend the areas in which
standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria are needed for the electronic
exchange and use of health information for purposes of adoption under section 300jj-14 of this title and
shall recommend an order of priority for the development, harmonization, and recognition of such
standards, specifications, and certification criteria . . . includ[ing] named standards, architectures, and
software schemes for the authentication and security of individually identifiable health information and
other information as needed to ensure the reproducible development of common solutions across
disparate entities.”).
37
See id. §§ 300jj-11(c)(2)–(3) (providing the National Coordinator’s duties, most of which
ultimately highlight the benefits of EHRs and aim to improve health care quality and access by
facilitating their widespread use); see also id. §§ 300jj-12(b)(2)(B)–(C) (putting forth the areas that the
Policy Committee should consider in making its recommendations, all of which concern achieving the
widespread benefits of EHR technology); id. § 300jj-13(b)(1)(A) (providing that the Standards
Committee’s recommendations as to standards and certification criteria shall be in harmony with those
provided by the Policy Committee).
38
See Benefits of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), HEALTH IT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov
/providers-professionals/benefits-electronic-health-records-ehrs (last updated Aug. 29, 2014) (“When
fully functional and exchangeable, the benefits of EHRs offer far more than a paper record can.”).

1112

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1103

ultimately depend on health care providers’ meaningful use of EHR
technology. Beginning in 2015, Medicare-eligible professionals who do
not meaningfully use EHRs will receive a one-percent Medicare payment
reduction for that calendar year, which will increase by a percentage point
for every subsequent year that the professional does not demonstrate
meaningful use.39
B. Meaningful Use Requirements
The success of implementing a comprehensive EHR database hinges
on whether participating professionals and hospitals actually use the
technology. Incentive payments under the HITECH Act are only available
to the providers that demonstrate meaningful use of EHRs.40 According to
Dr. David Blumenthal—who was the National Coordinator in 2010 when
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services first published the
meaningful use requirements—the requirements serve as a call to action
for health care providers insofar as they delineate how clinicians should
use EHR technology’s best features to their full potential.41
Pursuant to the HITECH Act, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services have broken up the meaningful use requirements into three stages
that providers must meet over the five consecutive years following the year
that they begin the incentive payment program.42 Thus, professionals and
hospitals that started the incentive program in 2011 were required to meet
meaningful use requirements for at least ninety days during the first year
and for the entire year of 2012;43 this period is Stage One.44 After meeting

39

Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, supra note 28.
See id. (“To qualify for incentive payments, eligible professionals must successfully
demonstrate meaningful use for each year of participation in the program.”).
41
See Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 15, at 503 (“Other core objectives include using
several software applications that begin to realize the true potential of EHRs to improve the safety,
quality, and efficiency of care. These features help clinicians to make better clinical decisions—and
avoid preventable errors. To qualify for incentive payments, clinicians must start employing such
clinical decision support tools. They must also start using the capability that undergirds much of the
value of EHRs: using records to enter clinical orders and, in particular, medication prescriptions. Only
when providers enter orders electronically can the computer help improve decisions by applying
clinical logic to those choices in light of all the recorded patient data. And to begin extending the
benefits of EHRs to patients themselves, the meaningful use requirements will include providing
patients with electronic versions of their health information.”).
42
See EHR Incentives & Certification: EHR Incentive Programs, HEALTHIT.GOV,
http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-incentive-programs (last updated Jan. 15, 2013)
(“Maximum EHR incentives are $44,000 over five consecutive years.”). For summaries of Stages One
and Two of the meaningful use requirements, see EHR Incentives & Certification: Meaningful Use
Definition & Objectives, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningfuluse-definition-objectives (last updated Mar. 18, 2014).
43
See My EHR Participation Timeline: 2011, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Participation-Timeline.html#.VOu541PF-Q4
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2015) (noting that a provider who started meaningful use in 2011 would have to have
demonstrated ninety days of Stage One meaningful use in 2011 to receive an incentive payment). That
40
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the Stage One meaningful use requirements, providers that started in 2011
then have to meet a different set of Stage Two requirements beginning in
2014.45 Finally, Stage Three of meaningful use commences in 2017 and
will require these providers to meet a third set of requirements.46 At the
most basic level, Stage One focuses on generating protected health
information in EHR format; Stage Two focuses on facilitating the
exchange of such information; and Stage Three focuses on improving
health outcomes with such information.47
Under each of the three stages, the meaningful use objectives are
broken into two groups: core objectives and menu set objectives.48 Stage
One sets forth fifteen core objectives and ten menu set objectives for
eligible professionals.49 Eligible professionals must meet the fifteen
required core objectives and at least five of the menu set objectives.50
There are fourteen required core objectives for eligible hospitals and
critical access hospitals and a list of ten menu set objectives.51 Eligible
hospitals must meet all fourteen core objectives and at least five of the ten
menu set objectives.52 In addition to the meaningful use objectives, eligible
professionals and hospitals must report clinical quality measures, which are
metrics that measure health outcomes, clinical processes, patient safety,
efficiency of resource use, care coordination, and overall patient health.53
same provider would have to demonstrate a full year of Stage One meaningful use in 2012 to receive an
incentive payment in that year. Id.
44
See, e.g., Meaningful Use: What Do You Know?, DEL. REGIONAL EXTENSION CENTER,
http://www.dehitrec.org/Documents/MU-What%20Do%20You%20Know%20%2010%2027%2013
.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (noting that everyone must attest to at least two years of meaningful use
in order to advance from Stage One to Stage Two); see also Stage 2, CMS.GOV,
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Stage_2.html (last
updated Nov. 5, 2014, 3:00 PM) (noting that providers that started participating in 2011 must achieve
meaningful use in three consecutive years before advancing to Stage Two).
45
Stage 2, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentive
Programs/Stage_2.html (last updated Nov. 5, 2014, 3:00 PM).
46
Neil Versel, CMS Officially Pushes Meaningful Use Stage 3 to 2017, Offers Flexibility in 2014,
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/neilversel/2014/08/29/cms-officiallypushes-meaningful-use-stage-3-to-2017-offers-flexibility-in-2014/.
47
See Robert Tagalicod & Jacob Reider, Progress on Adoption of Electronic Health Records,
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/eHealth/ListServ_Stage3Implementation.html (last updated Dec. 13,
2013, 12:41 PM) (stating that Stage One focuses on creation of health information, Stage Two focuses
on exchanging that information, and Stage Three focuses on using that information to improve health
outcomes).
48
See EHR Incentives & Certification: How to Attain Meaningful Use, HEALTHIT.GOV,
http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/how-attain-meaningful-use (last updated Jan. 15,
2013) [hereinafter How to Attain Meaningful Use] (listing meaningful use criteria for professionals and
hospitals).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Clinical Quality Measures Basics, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/ClinicalQualityMeasures.html (last updated Sept. 18,
2014, 10:48 AM). For a comprehensive summary of all of the core objectives, menu set objectives, and
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1. Stage One
The Stage One meaningful use requirements largely focus on capturing
information that is relevant to improving patient care and transmitting it
into a communicable electronic medium.54 Participating health care
providers must convert patient health records into electronic format for at
least eighty percent of their patients to meet certain requirements.55 Stage
One’s core objective requirements mandate that eligible professionals,
hospitals, and critical access hospitals carry out a number of objectives,
including but not limited to: implementing computerized provider order
entry for patients’ medications, providing patients with electronic copies of
their own records, maintaining up-to-date records for the health status of
patients, and achieving the capability to communicate with other providers
regarding a patient’s electronic records.56 On an individual patient level,
Stage One meaningful use criteria focus on incentivizing eligible providers
to: (1) convert that patient’s health information into a standard electronic
format; (2) use the information to track the patient’s clinical conditions; (3)
convey the information to other providers treating the patient; (4) begin
reporting clinical quality measures pertaining to that patient’s treatment
relative to a specific patient population; and (5) use the information to
involve the patient and family members in making care decisions.57 In
essence, all of the Stage One requirements standardize health records into
clinical quality measures, see Medicare & Medicaid EHR Incentive Program: Meaningful Use Stage 1
Requirements Overview, CMS.GOV 6–18 (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/MU_Stage1_ReqOverview.pdf [hereinafter
Stage 1 Requirements Overview].
54
How to Attain Meaningful Use, supra note 48.
55
For example, for the requirement mandating the provider to maintain an active medication
allergy list, providers must have recorded at least one entry in electronic format indicating the patient’s
medication allergies for at least eighty percent of all patients seen by the professional or admitted to the
hospital. Stage 1 Requirements Overview, supra note 53, at 11.
56
Specifically, the Stage One core objective requirements require that each eligible professional:
(1) implement computerized provider order entry for medication orders; (2) conduct drug-drug and
drug-allergy interaction checks; (3) maintain an up-to-date problem list for current and active
diagnoses; (4) generate and transmit electronic prescriptions; (5) maintain active medication lists; (6)
maintain active medication allergy lists; (7) record each patient’s preferred language, gender, race,
ethnicity, and date of birth; (8) record and chart changes in each patient’s height, weight, blood
pressure, body mass index, and growth chart status; (9) record smoking status for patients who are
thirteen years old or older; (10) “[i]mplement one clinical decision support rule relevant to specialty or
high clinical priority along with the ability to track compliance with that rule”; (11) permit patients to
view their records online, download, and transmit them within four business days of the information
being available to the professional; (12) provide clinical summaries for each visit; and (13) “[p]rotect
electronic health information created or maintained by the certified EHR technology through the
implementation of appropriate technical capabilities.” Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Eligible
Professional Meaningful Use Table of Contents Core and Menu Set Objectives: Stage 1 (2014
Definition), CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentiveProg
rams/Downloads/EP_MU_TableOfContents.pdf (last updated May 2014).
57
Arthur E. Peabody, Jr., Electronic Health Records: Technology Standards and Incentives for
Meaningful Use, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 177, 200 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013).
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electronic format and thereby make them more portable and accessible for
numerous parties.
2. Stage Two
On a broader level, Stage Two meaningful use criteria focus on
facilitating the exchange of patients’ EHRs and increasing patient control
over their records.58 The Stage Two requirements are similar to their Stage
One counterparts, but there are seventeen core objective requirements that
eligible professionals must meet instead of only thirteen.59 Further, the
Stage Two requirements focus more on enhancing health information
exchange, increasing requirements for e-prescribing, incorporating lab
results into certified EHR technology, and establishing more patient
control over their health information.60 Some noteworthy Stage Two core
objectives require eligible professionals to: (1) use secure electronic
messaging with patients to communicate relevant health information to
them; (2) achieve the capability to submit electronic data to immunization
registries; and (3) provide patients with the ability to view, download, and
transmit their health information online within four business days of the
information being available to the professional.61 The Stage Two core
objective requirements for hospitals and critical access hospitals are similar
to their Stage One counterparts, with the exception of several new ones
that require hospitals to achieve the capability to submit electronic
reportable laboratory results and electronic syndromic surveillance data to
public health agencies.62 Further, Stage Two sets forth new menu objective
requirements, including one that mandates hospitals and professionals to
record electronic notes in patient records.63 This objective is particularly

58
See Step 5: Achieve Meaningful Use Stage 2, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/
providers-professionals/step-5-achieve-meaningful-use-stage-2 (last updated Apr. 21, 2014) (“The final
rule for meaningful use Stage 2[] intends to increase health information exchange between providers
and promote patient engagement by giving patients secure online access to their health information.”).
59
Eligible Professional’s Guide to Stage 2 of the EHR Incentive Programs, CMS.GOV (Sept.
2013), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads
/Stage2_Guide_EPs_9_23_13.pdf.
60
Id.
61
Stage 2 Eligible Professional (EP) Meaningful Use Core and Menu Measures: Table of
Contents, CMS.GOV (Oct. 2012), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHR
IncentivePrograms/Downloads/ Stage2_MeaningfulUseSpecSheet_TableContents_EPs.pdf.
62
Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and Menu
Objectives: Table of Contents, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Oct. 2012),
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/Stage
2_MeaningfulUseSpecSheet_TableContents_EligibleHospitals_CAHs.pdf. This is an optional menu
objective for eligible professionals under Stage Two. Stage 2 Eligible Professional (EP) Meaningful
Use Core and Menu Measures, supra note 61.
63
See Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and
Menu Measures, supra note 62 (giving eligible hospitals the option to fulfill a menu objective by
recording electronic notes in patient records); see also Stage 2 Eligible Professional (EP) Meaningful
Use Core and Menu Measures, supra note 61 (giving eligible professionals this same option).
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relevant for purposes of health care fraud detection.
The primary aim of Stage Two meaningful use criteria is to promote a
nationwide electronic health information exchange.65 The National
Coordinator asserts that the primary benefit of creating such an exchange is
that it homogenizes the media through which health information is
transferred between providers and patients.66 Thus, the Stage-Two
meaningful use requirements premise the concept of a health information
exchange upon the electronic standardization of information, which
presumably enhances a provider’s ability to coordinate treatment. Further,
EHR technology facilitates the exchange of protected health information in
several ways, including directed exchange,67 query-based exchange,68 and
consumer-mediated exchange.69 Theoretically, the various types of
information exchange systems available under the EHR incentive program
should enable a wider array of health care providers to use EHRs
meaningfully and to better coordinate treatment.70 On the other hand, this
wide array of information-exchange media increases the difficulty of
determining who is accessing patients’ medical records and for what
reasons.
3. Stage Three
At the time of this Note’s publication, the federal government has not
yet officially published the Stage Three requirements, but authorities have
expressed a preliminary intent to focus the requirements on improving
quality and safety to ensure better health outcomes, improve population
health, provide patients with access to self-management tools, and broaden

64
This is true because of some of the functional characteristics of electronic documentation
methods, such as copy-paste functions. See Jayne O’Donnell, Feds Push Electronic Records that Make
Fraud Easier, USA TODAY (July 6, 2014, 10:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation
/2014/07/06/electronic-health-records-medicare-healthcare-fraud-funding/12157645/ (noting how
recording patient records in electronic format can facilitate fraudulent documentation through the use of
data cloning). I discuss some functional capabilities of EHRs that may facilitate fraud later in this Note.
See infra Part III.C.
65
See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (outlining the basic goals of the meaningful use
criteria).
66
See Health Information Exchange (HIE): What Is HIE?, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.health
it.gov/providers-professionals/health-information-exchange/what-hie (last updated May 12, 2014)
(“Many benefits exist with information exchange regardless of the means of [sic] which is it
transferred. However, the value of electronically exchanging information is the standardization of data.
Once standardized, the data transferred can seamlessly integrate into the recipients’ . . . (EHR), further
improving patient care.”).
67
Directed exchange is defined as the “ability to send and receive secure information
electronically between care providers to support coordinated care.” Id.
68
Query-based exchange is defined as the “ability for providers to find and/or request information
on a patient from other providers, often used for unplanned care.” Id.
69
Consumer-mediated exchange is defined as the “ability for patients to aggregate and control the
use of their health information among providers.” Id.
70
Id.
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access to a more patient-centered health information exchange. The
Policy Committee’s Meaningful Use Work Group met in July 2012 to
make initial policy recommendations for Stage Three.72 One of the group’s
members, Charlene Underwood, Director of Government and Industry
Affairs at Siemens Medical, emphasized the need for the Stage Three
requirements to bring about a “more patient-centric solution.”73 Some
notable Stage Three goals that the group contemplated include: (1)
improving the tracking of individual care goals, (2) improving
documentation of all persons involved in treating the patient, and (3)
improving patient input in care decisions.74
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services originally slated
Stage Three to commence in 2016 but the Centers revised the timeline in
December of 2013.75 Under this new timeline, Stage Two will extend
through 2016 and Stage Three will begin in 2017 for those providers who
have met the Stage Two requirements for at least two years.76 A notice of
proposed rulemaking for Stage Three was to be released in the fall of
2014,77 but the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ultimately
delayed and submitted a public notice of the proposed rule to the Executive
Office of Management and Budget in January of 2015.78

71
See Draft Recommendations Meaningful Use Stage 3, MEANINGFUL USE WORK GRP.,
HEALTHIT.GOV 3–6, 19, 23, 58, 60, available at http://www.healthit.gov/FACAS/sites/faca/files/
muwg_stage3_draft_rec_07_aug_13_.v3.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) (providing various
recommendations as to how to improve patient outcomes and population health using the robust health
information database that should be established from completing Stages One and Two).
72
David Raths, MU Work Group to Make Initial Stage 3 Recommendations in August,
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (July 5, 2012), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/mu-workgroup-make-initial-stage-3-recommendations-august?WA.
73
Id.
74
Id.; see Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (stating that some Stage Three goals include
“[d]ecision support for national high-priority conditions[,] . . . [a]ccess to comprehensive patient data
through patient-centered HIE [health information exchange, and] [i]mproving population health”).
75
Jon Mertz, CMS Proposes New Timeline or Meaningful Use Stage 2 and Stage 3, HL7
STANDARDS (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.hl7standards.com/blog/2013/12/06/cms-proposes-newtimeline-for-meaningful-use-stage-2-and-stage-3/.
76
See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., New CMS Rule Allows Flexibility in
Certified EHR Technology for 2014 (Aug. 29, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/
MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2014-Press-releases-items/2014-08-29.html (“The rule also
finalizes the extension of Stage 2 through 2016 for certain providers and announces the Stage 3
timeline, which will begin in 2017 for providers who first became meaningful EHR users in 2011 or
2012.”).
77
Tagalicod & Reider, supra note 47; see CMS Issues Final Rule to Extend Meaningful Use
Requirements, IHEALTHBEAT (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/9/2/cmsreleases-final-rule-to-extend-meaningful-use-requirements (discussing the potential impact of the
proposed Stage Three rule on use requirements for health-care providers).
78
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage 3, 80
Fed. Reg. 16732 (proposed Mar. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 495); Philip Peisch, CMS
Submits Proposed Rule on Stage 3 Meaningful Use to OMB, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/cms-submits-proposed-rule-stage-3-meaningful-use-to-omb.
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C. Meaningful Use Enforcement
Beginning in 2015, eligible professionals who do not meet meaningful
use requirements will receive reduced Medicare physician fee schedule
payments.79 This Medicare payment reduction will begin at one percent in
2015, and it will increase to two percent in 2016 and three percent in 2017
if the professional continues not to achieve meaningful use of EHRs.80 The
payment reduction can reach up to a maximum of five percent for a
Medicare-eligible professional who does not demonstrate meaningful use
after 2015.81 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services will also
begin penalizing eligible hospitals in 2015 if they do not demonstrate
meaningful use of EHRs by reducing their Medicare payment rate as
applied in their Inpatient Prospective Payment System.82 Eligible
professionals and hospitals must report their usage of EHRs annually
according to the aforementioned meaningful use objectives and clinical
quality measures in an electronic attestation module.83 The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services determine whether the eligible
professional or hospital meets the meaningful use requirements based upon
their annual attestations.84 If the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services suspect that a provider is making fraudulent attestations, they may
subject them to an audit.85
Based upon the incentive payment schedule and the increasingly harsh
penalties for non-compliance, the EHR Incentive Program is designed to
make meaningful use of EHRs by all U.S. health care providers a reality.
While the HITECH Act’s meaningful use requirements are not strict
insofar as they do not lead to criminal liability for noncompliance, in
79

Faccenda & Parkin, supra note 16, at 15.
See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 217 (describing penalties that follow from not achieving
meaningful use).
81
Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, supra note 28.
82
Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 217; see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM:
PAYMENT SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES, 3 (2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-andEducation/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf
(explaining how the IPPS payment rate for eligible hospitals is determined through a standardized
formula accounting for various factors such as market conditions, costs associated with treating a
beneficiary for clinical conditions, and number of readmissions).
83
For an explanation of meaningful use attestation and an example of the attestation module
format for eligible professionals, see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ATTESTATION USER GUIDE FOR ELIGIBLE PROFESSIONALS: MEDICARE ELECTRONIC
HEALTH RECORD (EHR) INCENTIVE PROGRAM 4, 17–29 (2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Reg
ulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/downloads/EP_Attestation_User_Guide.
pdf.
84
See Meaningful Use Attestation, PRACTICE FUSION, http://www.practicefusion.com/meaning
ful-use-attestation/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (noting that eligible providers must attest to the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services for purposes of meeting meaningful use requirements).
85
Registration & Attestation, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/RegistrationandAttestation.html (last updated Dec. 29, 2014, 2:48
PM).
80
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theory, the Act’s incentive scheme enforces compliance for the large
majority of health care providers who receive reimbursement payments
under Medicare and Medicaid. The widespread use of EHRs is a
fundamental goal underlying the HITECH Act’s incentive scheme. In this
vein, it is important to note that the widespread usage of EHRs changes the
landscape of issues relating to data security and health care fraud.
D. The HITECH Act’s Modifications to HIPAA and Security of Protected
Health Information
The HITECH Act not only set forth an EHR incentive program, but it
also implemented several changes to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which is the primary federal
legislation that regulates the exchange of protected health information.86
Prior to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s passage, if a
covered entity87 under HIPAA contracted with a business associate88 to
86
See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa
/understanding/summary/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (stating that the HIPAA Privacy Rule, for the first
time, sets forth national standards for the use and disclosure of protected health information).
87
Covered entities include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and “[a] health care provider
who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by
[Subchapter C: Administrative Data Standards and Related Requirements].” 45 C.F.R. § 160.102
(2013).
88
Business associates include entities such as third party administrators that assist in claims
processing, attorneys who counsel health care providers, consultants, medical transcriptionists, and
health care clearinghouses that translate nonstandard health information into a standardized format. 45
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). This regulation further provides:

(1) . . . [B]usiness associate means, with respect to a covered entity, a person who:
(i) On behalf of such covered entity or of an organized health care
arrangement . . . in which the covered entity participates, but other than in the
capacity of a member of the workforce of such covered entity or arrangement,
creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health information for a function
or activity regulated by this subchapter, including claims processing or
administration, data analysis, processing or administration, utilization review,
quality assurance, patient safety activities . . . billing, benefit management, practice
management, and repricing; or (ii) Provides, other than in the capacity of a member
of the workforce of such covered entity, legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data
aggregation . . . , management, administrative, accreditation, or financial services to
or for such covered entity, or to or for an organized health care arrangement in
which the covered entity participates, where the provision of the service involves the
disclosure of protected health information from such covered entity or arrangement,
or from another business associate of such covered entity or arrangement, to the
person. . . . (3) Business associate includes: (i) A Health Information Organization,
E-prescribing Gateway, or other person that provides data transmission services with
respect to protected health information to a covered entity and that requires access
on a routine basis to such protected health information. (ii) A person that offers a
personal health record to one or more individuals on behalf of a covered entity. (iii)
A subcontractor that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health
information on behalf of the business associate. (4) Business associate does not
include: (i) A health care provider, with respect to disclosures by a covered entity to
the health care provider concerning the treatment of the individual. (ii) A plan
sponsor, with respect to disclosures by a group health plan (or by a health insurance
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perform services that involved the exchange of patients’ health information
and the business associate disclosed such information,89 the government
would not enforce HIPAA to punish such disclosure, but the covered entity
would instead have to sue the business associate directly for breach of
contract.90 Pursuant to the HITECH Act, business associates—which
include parties such as third party administrators for claims processing,
attorneys, consultants, and accounting firms—are now subject to the same
HIPAA liability as covered entities, meaning that they are subject to direct
governmental enforcement if they disclose protected health information.91
Specifically, the HITECH Act mandates that business associates comply
with the HIPAA Security Rule by maintaining confidentiality of all
protected health information that they create or handle, protecting against
unauthorized access of such information, training their employees,92 and
implementing security measures for protecting such health information.93
The HITECH Act also subjects business associates to the HIPAA

issuer or HMO with respect to a group health plan) to the plan sponsor, to the extent
that the requirements of § 164.504(f) of this subchapter apply and are met. (iii) A
government agency, with respect to determining for, or enrollment in, a government
health plan that provides public benefits and is administered by another government
agency, or collecting protected health information for such purposes, to the extent
such activities are authorized by law. (iv) A covered entity participating in an
organized health care arrangement that performs a function or activity as described
by paragraph (1)(i) of this definition for or on behalf of such organized health care
arrangement, or that provides a service as described in paragraph (1)(ii) of this
definition to or for such organized health care arrangement by virtue of such
activities or services.
Id.
89
“Disclosure means the release, transfer, provision of access to, or divulging in any manner of
information outside the entity holding the information.” Id.
90
Deven McGraw, Summary of Health Privacy Provisions in the 2009 Economic Stimulus
Legislation, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 2 (Apr. 29, 2009), https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/
20090324_ARRAPrivacy.pdf.
91
See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566,
5577 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164) (“[T]his final rule . . . adopts the
NPRM proposal to add the term ‘business associate’ to . . . [several] provisions of the Enforcement
Rule. . . . This is done to implement sections 13401 and 13404 of the Act, which impose direct civil
money penalty liability on business associates for their violations of certain provisions of the HIPAA
Rules.”).
92
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(a)(1)–(4) (2013) (“Covered entities and business associates must do
the following: (1) Ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health
information the covered entity or business associate creates, receives, maintains, or transmits. (2)
Protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such
information. (3) Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such information that
are not permitted or required under subpart E of this part. (4) Ensure compliance with this subpart by its
workforce.” (emphasis added) (demonstrating the rules for covered entities)).
93
See id. §§ 164.308(a)–(b) (setting forth the security specifications that business associates must
implement in order to comply with HIPAA Security Rule).
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94

Privacy Rule, which protects patients’ “individually identifiable health
information”95 from being disclosed or used for purposes other than those
delineated by the Rule itself or without the patient’s written consent.96
There are two primary situations in which covered entities are required to
disclose protected health information: (1) when the individual patient or a
personal representative requests disclosure; or (2) when the Department of
Health and Human Services is investigating compliance.97 The Privacy
Rule also permits disclosure and use of protected health information
without the patient’s consent in certain situations such as if such actions
are required for treatment or public health research.98 Similar to the
Security Rule, the pre-HITECH Act Privacy Rule did not govern business
associates insofar as they were only required to meet the disclosure
provisions set forth in their contracts with covered entities.99 The HITECH
Act modified the Privacy Rule by giving it some teeth: business associates
now must comply with the Privacy Rule requirements in the same manner
as the covered entities with which they contract.100 This is a crucial legal
development in health information security, because business associates of
covered entities might not be so adept at managing electronic health
information, yet they are now similarly liable for any misuse or disclosure
of protected health information.101 Further, the Privacy Rule now requires
94
Health Information Privacy: The Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/
hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
95
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). This regulation further provides:

Individually identifiable health information is information that is a subset of health
information, including demographic information collected from an individual, and:
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health
care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual;
and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual.
Id. This information is used synonymously with protected health information throughout HIPAA. Id.
96
See OCR Privacy Brief: Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV 4 (May 2003),
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf
[hereinafter
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule] (discussing the basic principle for uses and disclosures of
protected health information for purposes of the Privacy Rule).
97
See id. (discussing the required disclosures of protected health information under the Privacy
Rule).
98
Id. at 4–5.
99
See McGraw, supra note 90, at 2 (discussing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s
modifications to the applicability of HIPAA to business associates of covered entities).
100
“The additional requirements of this subchapter that relate to privacy and that are made
applicable with respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate and shall
be incorporated into the business associate agreement between the business associate and the covered
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 17934(a) (2012).
101
See Leon Rodriguez, Enforcing HIPAA in the Age of Electronic Health Records: The View of
the Office of Civil Rights from Its Director, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO
HEALTH CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 301, 303 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013)
(“HITECH’s extension of liability to business associates improves our compliance efforts by holding
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that covered entities and business associates only disclose or use the
minimum amount of information necessary to achieve the purpose for
which it is being used.102 This requirement might prove to yield more
HIPAA violations because business associates may not be as capable as
covered entities in determining what amount of protected health
information constitutes the minimum necessary to achieve a health care
purpose. In addition to subjecting more parties to HIPAA liability, the
HITECH Act increases requirements for instances where protected health
information is breached.
1. The Data Breach Notification Law
Along with modifying the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules with
respect to business associates, the HITECH Act implements new
requirements for breaches of secure protected health information. The
HITECH Act establishes a new data breach notification requirement (data
breach rule) for covered entities and business associates.103 If there is a
breach of protected health information, the data breach rule mandates that
the concerned covered entities and business associates must notify the
Department of Health and Human Services and the individuals whose
health information was breached.104 A breach occurs when there is an
“unauthorized acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected health
information,”105 but there are also some exceptions to the notification
requirement.106 Essentially, if the protected health information does not
leave the business relationship between business associates and covered
entities or if the information is encrypted, then the data breach rule does
not apply.107 The data breach rule also requires EHR software vendors to
notify individual owners of protected health information and the Federal
Trade Commission if the vendors discover that protected health

business associates accountable in the same manner as covered entities. Given that many of the most
serious breaches occur at the business associate level, this change will greatly improve the privacy and
security of health information.”).
102
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2013); see Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 96, at 10
(“A central aspect of the Privacy Rule is the principle of ‘minimum necessary’ use and disclosure.”).
103
42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012).
104
Id. §§ 17932(a)–(b).
105
McGraw, supra note 90, at 3.
106
See id. (noting that the breach notification requirement does not apply in situations where the
unauthorized person receiving protected health information could not have reasonably been expected to
retain it; where the breach is unintentional within the scope of a professional relationship, and the
information stays within the relationship; and where the breach is caused inadvertently by a workforce
member under the authority of the covered entity or business associate, and the information does not
leave the facility responsible for retaining it); see also Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected
Health Information, CENTER FOR PRAC. IMPROVEMENT & INNOVATION (Nov. 2009), http://www.am
ericanehr.com/Libraries/documents/hipaa_breach-notification.sflb.ashx (noting that breach notification
requirement does not apply in certain situations).
107
Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, supra note 106.
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108

information in their software format has been breached. Covered entities
that experience a breach affecting more than five hundred residents of a
U.S. state or jurisdiction are required to notify popular media outlets in
such jurisdiction, as well as all affected individuals.109 Covered entities that
experience such a breach must also notify the Department of Health and
Human Services immediately,110 which then must publish information
regarding this breach on its website and report it to Congress.111 In
explaining its mission, the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of
Health and Human Services (Health Office for Civil Rights)112 extolled the
virtues of the data breach rule by noting that it helps government
authorities in systematically identifying common security vulnerabilities
associated with protected health information.113 A covered entity’s or
business associate’s failure to notify the appropriate parties of a data
breach results in a HIPAA violation, which subjects the entity to a fine that
accounts for the nature and magnitude of the breach.114 These notification
requirements do not preempt state data breach requirements unless they are
contrary to them, meaning that providers might have to meet additional
notification requirements, depending upon their jurisdiction.115

108
42 U.S.C. §§ 17937(a)(1)–(2) (2012). Once the EHR software vendor has notified the Federal
Trade Commission, the Commission must then notify the Department of Health and Human Services of
the breach. Id. § 17937(d). If these notification requirements are not met, such failure will be
prosecuted as “an unfair and deceptive act or practice in violation of a regulation under section
[18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B))] regarding unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.” Id. § 17937(e).
109
Id. § 17932(e)(2); Health Information Privacy: Breach Notification Rule, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotification rule/ (last visited Feb. 24,
2015).
110
McGraw, supra note 90, at 4.
111
Id.
112
The Office of Civil Rights is a division of the Department of Health and Human Services that
is responsible for enforcing laws related to civil rights in the context of health care and health
information privacy. Office for Civil Rights: OCR’s Mission and Vision, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.
gov/ocr/office/about/mission-vision.html#mission (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
113
See Rodriguez, supra note 101, at 302–03 (“We now have a record of the breach notifications
that we have received. These notifications have offered both OCR and covered entities vital insights
into the root causes of security vulnerabilities affecting health records. While some breach reports have
led to enforcement actions, we have utilized breach reports mainly to ensure that the reporting entities
take corrective action and to deepen our understanding of the operational issues surrounding HIPAA
compliance.”).
114
See 42 U.S.C. § 17939(a)(2) (2012) (“Any violation by a covered entity under thus [sic]
subchapter is subject to enforcement and penalties under section 1176 and 1177 of the Social Security
Act.”).
115
McGraw, supra note 90, at 4.
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2. Strengthened Security Enforcement
Another way in which the HITECH Act encourages increased security
of protected health information is by strengthening the penalties for
security and privacy violations.116 The Act established a tiered system of
monetary penalties for providers that commit HIPAA violations.117 At the
lowest tier, a provider who does not know but should have known by
“exercising reasonable diligence” that they violated a privacy or security
provision is fined $100 for each violation.118 At the highest tier, a provider
who committed a HIPAA violation due to “willful neglect” and did not
take action to correct it can be subjected to a $50,000 fine for each
violation.119 The HITECH Act also requires the Department of Health and
Human Services to conduct periodic audits of covered entities and business
associates to make sure that they comply with HIPAA requirements.120
These audits may also lead to enforcement actions, which theoretically
should bolster health information security through deterrence.121 The
Health Office for Civil Rights has already begun to conduct audits of
covered entities to make sure that they have adequate procedures in place
for handling health information breaches.122
The HITECH Act’s Omnibus Final Rule123 went into effect on March
26, 2013 and it grants the Health Office for Civil Rights authority to
investigate protected health information breaches.124 In addition to setting
forth the data breach rule and the tiered monetary penalties discussed
supra, the Omnibus Final Rule also requires covered entities and business
116
Sarah E. Swank, Enforcement Under HIPAA and HITECH: Why You Need to Worry Again
About HIPAA, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 287, 288 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013).
117
Id. at 288–89.
118
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a) (2012); Swank, supra note 116, at 289 tbl.17.1.
119
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a); Swank, supra note 116, at 289 tbl.17.1.
120
42 U.S.C. § 17940 (2012).
121
The former director of the Health Office for Civil Rights, Leon Rodriguez, opined that “the use
of our audit capability gives us insights into issues that we cannot readily see in our complaint-driven
investigations but that often are the issues that pose the greatest threat to health information security.”
Rodriguez, supra note 101, at 303.
122
See, e.g., Health Information Privacy: HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Audit
Program, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa /enforcement/audit/index.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2015) (noting that in 2011, the Health Office for Civil Rights evaluated and assisted over a
hundred covered entities regarding policies for notifying consumers and the government in the event of
health information breaches); see also Swank, supra note 116, at 290 (describing the Health Office for
Civil Rights’ pilot audit program and noting that “[f]or all entities, Security Rule compliance problems
posed greater difficulties than Privacy Rule compliance problems”).
123
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan.
25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
124
See Swank, supra note 116, at 292 (explaining the complaint process for notifying the Health
Office for Civil Rights of a breach and the subsequent investigation that the Office conducts in
response to such complaints).
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associates to engage in corrective action plans, which streamline the
entities’ security procedures with respect to protected health information
and EHRs.125 Since the Privacy Rule’s initial compliance date in April
2003, the Health Office for Civil Rights has received over 80,836 HIPAA
complaints and has resolved 19,726 privacy cases as of April 2013.126
Some of the most prevalent issues reported in the HIPAA complaints
included “[i]mpermissible use and disclosures of [protected health
information],” a lack of security safeguards for electronic protected health
information, and excessive use of such information for unauthorized
purposes.127 Many of these complaints—which the Health Office for Civil
Rights brought against a wide variety of health care providers, including
large health care conglomerates,128 private practices,129 hospitals,130 and
government agencies131—developed into enforcement actions that ended in
settlements.
The level of government security enforcement related to EHRs
generally has increased in the wake of the Omnibus Final Rule.132 In the
pre-HITECH Act era, the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Department of Justice cooperated with each other to investigate HIPAA
complaints and to conduct criminal investigations.133 The HITECH Act—
through its data breach notification requirements and audit programs—has
implemented government regulatory agendas from various angles to
control HIPAA violations and prosecute criminals in the health care
field.134 Not only does the HITECH Act increase the enforcement power of
125
See id. at 293 (describing the corrective action plan’s purpose and goal of enticing health care
entities to modify EHR policies and procedures that violate HIPAA).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See id. at 294 (noting the BlueCross and Blueshield of Tennessee settlement for $1.5 million in
March of 2012).
129
See id. at 294–95 (noting the Phoenix Cardiac Surgery, P.C. settlement for $100,000 in April
of 2012).
130
See id. at 294 (noting the Hospice of North Idaho settlement for $50,000 in January of 2013).
131
See id. at 295–96 (noting the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services settlement for
$1.7 million in October 2009).
132
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., New Rule Protects Patient Privacy,
Secures Health Information (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres
/01/20130117b.html (“The final omnibus rule . . . strengthens the government’s ability to enforce
[HIPAA].”).
133
Swank, supra note 116, at 288.
134
See id. (“The HITECH Act added an audit protocol that gave OCR affirmative authority to
audit covered entities and business associates. In addition, the HITECH Act clarified DOJ’s authority
to prosecute federal criminal activity related to HIPAA, while extending enforcement authority for civil
violations of HIPAA to the state attorneys general. Finally, the HITECH Act expanded those entities
directly regulated under HIPAA to include business associates, who previously contractually agreed to
HIPAA compliance through business associate agreements with covered entities. Enforcement of the
violation of federal statutory protections by covered entities and business associates will only increase
with the Omnibus Final Rule, which went into effect on March 26, 2013. All these provisions evidence
an intent to protect PHI and the privacy of individuals served by health care providers across the
nation.”).
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federal authorities, but it also grants state attorneys general the authority to
enforce HIPAA regulations related to privacy and security of protected
health information.135 Further, state attorneys general have authority to
enforce state laws with respect to protected health information,136 but the
Department of Justice is primarily responsible for prosecuting criminal
cases related to HIPAA.137
The Federal Bureau of Investigation also retains authority to
investigate and prosecute fraud and other criminal activities in the health
care field.138 In light of the HITECH Act’s focus on promoting increased
enforcement against health care fraud and HIPAA violations, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation formed a partnership with the Department of
Health and Human Services139 and the Department of Justice called the
HHS Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team Task
Force.140 One of the first criminal convictions for a HIPAA violation after
the HITECH Act occurred in April 2010, when the Federal Bureau of
Investigation concluded an investigation into a former UCLA Healthcare
System employee who—after being discharged—had illegally read EHRs
of celebrities and high-profile patients.141 The former employee pleaded
guilty to four misdemeanor counts of violating the HIPAA Privacy Rule
and was sentenced to four months in federal prison.142 Despite the
HITECH Act’s enhancement of HIPAA enforcement and implementation
of security measures, breaches of protected health information still occur
on a wide scale throughout the United States.

135

Id. at 296; see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d) (2012) (“[I]n any case in which the attorney general of a
State has reason to believe that an interest of one or more of the residents of that State has been or is
threatened or adversely affected by any person who violates a provision of this part, the attorney
general of the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of such residents of the State
in a district court of the United States . . . (A) to enjoin further such violation by the defendant; or (B)
to obtain damages on behalf of such residents of the State . . . .’”). For a discussion of parens patriae
standing in relation to other standing doctrines, see generally Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational
Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59 (2014).
136
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d)(5) (“For purposes of bringing any civil action under paragraph (1),
nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent an attorney general of a State from exercising the
powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of that State.”); Swank, supra note 116, at 296–97
(noting that the HITECH Act encourages state attorneys general to cooperate with the Health Office for
Civil Rights in enforcing the security of protected health information).
137
Swank, supra note 116, at 297.
138
See id. at 298 (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation retains special units and field
offices across the country to investigate crime and fraud in the health care industry).
139
Specifically, the Office of the Inspector General. Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 299.
142
Id.
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3. Data Breaches Abound
The HITECH Act’s data breach rule fosters accountability for misuse
or loss of protected health information, but it has not stopped these
problems from occurring in the first place. Loss or theft of mobile
electronic devices is a primary way in which data breaches occur within
the ambit of the HITECH Act. Some common examples include: backup
tapes, desktop or laptop computers, and computer components containing
EHRs being lost by or stolen from the health care provider.143 In
September 2011, 4.6 million records were breached when backup tapes
were stolen from government health care organizations.144 In February
2011, 1.7 million records were breached when backup tapes were stolen
from Jacobi Medical Center in Bronx, New York.145 In October 2011, 1.6
million records were breached when three backup tapes went missing from
Nemours, a children’s health organization in Delaware.146 In April 2012,
315,000 records were breached when ten backup tapes were stolen from
Emory University Hospital in Georgia.147 In March 2011, 300,000 records
were breached when backup tapes were stolen from the Cord Blood
Registry.148
As for desktop or laptop computers, 4.2 million records were breached
in November 2011 when a desktop computer was stolen from Sutter
Physicians Service and Foundation in California.149 In September 2009, 1
million records were breached when a computer was stolen from the
Oklahoma Department of Human Services.150 In October 2009, 850,000
records were breached when a laptop was stolen from BlueCross
BlueShield/Highmark.151 In April 2011, 514,000 records were breached
when a computer was stolen from the Eisenhower Medical Center in
California,152 and 133,000 records were breached when a laptop was stolen
143

Two million records were breached in March 2011 when HealthNet and IBM lost server drives
in California. Lucy L. Thomson, Health Care Data Breaches and Information Security: Addressing
Threats and Risks to Patient Data, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH
CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 253, 255–56 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013). One
and a half million records were breached in November 2009 when HealthNet lost portable hard drives
in Connecticut. Id. A million records were breached in October 2009 when hard drives went missing
from BlueCross BlueShield in Tennessee. Id. Eight hundred thousand records were breached in March
2012 when computer devices were lost at the California Department of Child Support. Id. In April
2011, 93,500 records were breached when hard drives were lost at the Mid-State Medical Center in
Connecticut. Id. Fifty thousand records were breached in March 2013 when a contractor of the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services lost a thumb drive. Id.
144
Id. at 256.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
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153

from the Oklahoma Department of Health. In February 2011, 84,000
records were breached when a computer was stolen from the Saint Francis
Hospital in Oklahoma.154 In November 2011, 63,000 records were
breached when a laptop was stolen from the Neurological Institute of
Savannah in Georgia.155 In January 2013, 57,000 records were breached
when a laptop was stolen from the Stanford University Children’s Hospital
in California.156 In March 2012, 34,500 records were breached when a
laptop was stolen from Howard University Hospital in Washington, D.C.157
These reported breaches demonstrate that the ability to store copious
amounts of data electronically in one device can be a gift and a curse. An
employee simply losing a thumb drive can cause tens of thousands of
EHRs to end up in an identity thief’s possession.158 The data breach rule
incentivizes health care providers to be wary of such possible breaches and
it encourages them to adopt security measures to prevent a breach or at
least soften the repercussions arising from it.
The HITECH Act’s changes to HIPAA liability are meant to bolster
security and privacy measures for entities managing patient EHRs, but the
Act’s encouragement of increased enforcement and its establishment of a
larger liability net may actually muddy the waters of health care fraud.
Specifically, given that business associates and covered entities must now
exercise more efforts to protect and manage EHRs, providers with
fraudulent intentions might be able to point the finger at other parties in
order to shield themselves from their own malfeasance. When the HITECH
Act’s increased liability net is coupled with the EHR incentive program
that encourages more information exchange and increased patient access to
protected health information, fraudsters have even more parties to blame
for inconsistencies in medical records. For example, if federal authorities
investigate a doctor who fraudulently bills Medicare on a routine basis, the
doctor might defend himself by contending that another party such as the
patient, herself, or a third party billing administrator—who now all have
increased access to patient EHRs in the wake of the HITECH Act—was
responsible for causing a glitch in the patient’s EHR record that led to the
higher amount being billed. Investigators of health care fraud should be
cognizant of instances like these where the HITECH Act and increased use
of EHRs changes the landscape for security and fraud liability.

153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See id. (discussing the effects of a March 2013 breach at the North Carolina Department of
Health and Human Services).
154
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III. ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND THE
NEW TOPOGRAPHY OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD
The HITECH Act’s EHR incentive program, meaningful use
requirements, and HIPAA modifications strive to achieve better quality
and coordination in health care. Yet, the EHR agenda that the Act
advances—as well as its subjecting more parties to liability for breaches of
protected health information—will significantly alter the landscape of
fraud detection. Some policymakers, prosecutors, and commentators
express concern over the ways in which EHRs may assist health care
providers to commit fraud because the HITECH Act does not thoroughly
address this issue.159 Although the HITECH Act strengthens law
enforcement efforts with respect to medical identity theft and protection of
patients’ EHRs, it does not address some of the new legal problems that its
desired outcomes may manifest. One such problem that will come to the
forefront in the Act’s wake is the increased burden on prosecutors and
auditors to detect fraud in EHRs.
A. Health Care Fraud: Civil Penalties Under the False Claims Act
The primary legislation that punishes perpetrators of health care fraud
is the False Claims Act,160 a statute originally enacted during the Civil
War-era that Congress has broadened to encompass a wide array of
fraudulent activity against the federal government.161 Section 3729 of the
False Claims Act allows for treble damages and imposes a $5,000 to
$10,000 fine upon any person who, inter alia, “knowingly presents, or
159
See, e.g., Mike Miliard, Providers Respond to Holder, Sebelius on ‘Troubling Indications’ of
EHR Fraud, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
providers-respond-holder-sebelius-troubling-indications-ehr-fraud (noting that U.S. Attorney General
Eric Holder and Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius warned against using EHRs
for fraudulent purposes and reporting that some health care professionals expressed dissatisfaction over
the lack of guidance from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services concerning protection
against EHR fraud); OIG: CMS Should Improve Efforts to Detect, Prevent Fraud in EHRs,
IHEALTHBEAT (May 29, 2014), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/5/29/oig-cms-shouldimprove-efforts-to-detect-prevent-fraud-in-ehrs (“The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT
and CMS should develop a comprehensive plan to better address fraud vulnerabilities in electronic
health records, according to a report released Tuesday by the HHS Office of the Inspector
General . . . .”).
160
False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1621 (1863) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012)).
161
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 5–8 (Aug. 6, 2009) (discussing the origins and development of the
False Claims Act as of 2009); see also Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers
and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1369–70 (2002) (“The FCA was enacted in
1863 in response to ‘rampant fraud’ perpetrated on the Union Army during the Civil War. Almost 140
years later, multiple amendments have expanded the law beyond its modest military origins to
encompass virtually any individual or entity that transacts business with the federal government. The
current version of the FCA prohibits a variety of fraudulent activities involving government funds.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval” or who makes a materially false statement to the government.162
Thus, the False Claims Act can subject offenders to significant monetary
penalties, especially those who are health care providers submitting
thousands of claims per year to the federal government through programs
like Medicare and Medicaid.163 The False Claims Act allows for parties to
bring qui tam actions,164 which permit whistleblowers165 to sue perpetrators
of fraud on behalf of the government.166 The False Claims Act’s allowance
162
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012) (“[A]ny person who—(A) knowingly presents, or causes to
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim; (C) conspires to
commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G); (D) has possession, custody, or
control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes
to be delivered, less than all of that money or property; . . . or (G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, . . . plus 3 times the
amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.”); see also id. §
3729(b) (“For purposes of this section—(1) the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘knowingly’ —(A) mean that a
person, with respect to information—(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information; and (B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud; (2) the term ‘claim’—
(A) means any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and
whether or not the United States has title to the money or property, that—(i) is presented to an officer,
employee, or agent of the United States; or (ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the
money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government
program or interest, and if the United States Government—(I) provides or has provided any portion of
the money or property requested or demanded; or (II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded; and (B) does not
include requests or demands for money or property that the Government has paid to an individual as
compensation for Federal employment or as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual’s
use of the money or property; (3) the term ‘obligation’ means an established duty, whether or not fixed,
arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, from a
fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment;
and (4) the term “material” means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing,
the payment or receipt of money or property.”).
163
See Krause, supra note 161, at 1370 (describing how health care providers can be subjected to
much larger fines under the False Claims Act than other typical offenders like defense contractors
because of the nature of health care providers’ business).
164
Qui tam actions allow private citizens to bring civil actions against defendants in order to
enforce a federal statute. Thus, while private citizens bring these actions, they are essentially brought
on behalf of the U.S. government as well. See Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 (1989) (“The qui tam action offers an unconventional means by
which Congress may enlist the aid of private citizens in enforcing Federal statutory schemes. In such an
action, a private person maintains a civil proceeding on behalf of both herself and the United States to
recover damages and/or to enforce penalties available under a statute prohibiting specified conduct.
The private plaintiff shares any monetary recovery with the United States.” (internal citation omitted)).
165
They are also referred to as “relators” under the False Claims Act. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C.
§ 3733(a)(1) (2012) (“Any information obtained by the Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney
General under this section may be shared with any qui tam relator if the Attorney General or designee
determine it is necessary as part of any false claims act investigation.” (footnote omitted)).
166
Id. Further, “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person
and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.” Id.
§ 3730(b)(1).
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for qui tam actions has greatly extended the government’s fraud
enforcement capacity, primarily because whistleblowers can receive a
percentage of any monetary penalties that offenders have to pay.167
Furthermore, Congress recently amended the False Claims Act in its 2009
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act.168 One major consequence of these
2009 amendments was Congress’s expansion of liability to encompass
parties who failed to reimburse the government for prior overpayment.
Thus, whereas the pre-2009 False Claims Act only made parties liable once
they presented a claim to get payment from the government, the post-2009
False Claims Act now covers those parties who knowingly avoid paying
back the government.169 In this light, the government is employing new
tactics to track down and punish fraudsters. Nonetheless, it needs to double
its efforts, because fraud still runs rampant.
The principles of the False Claims Act—and the Act’s provision of qui
tam actions—aim to enhance government efforts in detecting and deterring
health care fraud, but many of the parties who actually blow the whistle
under the Act have ulterior motives.170 While some whistleblower claims
167
See id. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2) (“(1) If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a person
under subsection (b), such person shall, subject to the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at least
15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim,
depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action. Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of specific
information (other than information provided by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 10 percent of the
proceeds, taking into account the significance of the information and the role of the person bringing the
action in advancing the case to litigation. Any payment to a person under the first or second sentence of
this paragraph shall be made from the proceeds. Any such person shall also receive an amount for
reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant. (2) If the
Government does not proceed with an action under this section, the person bringing the action or
settling the claim shall receive an amount which the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil
penalty and damages. The amount shall be not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the
proceeds of the action or settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds. Such person shall also
receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred,
plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against
the defendant.” (footnote omitted)); see also HOYT W. TORRAS, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: A
PHYSICIAN’S GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE 67 (2d ed. 2003) (“Qui tam plaintiffs—sometimes referred to as
relators and whistle-blowers—may personally receive 10% to 30% of the total recovery plus reasonable
attorney fees. The actual percentage is determined by the court, and there are certain maximums
depending on whether the government participates in the case.”).
168
Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 and
31 U.S.C.).
169
See Daniel C. Lumm, Comment, The 2009 “Clarifications” to the False Claims Act of 1863:
The All-Purpose Antifraud Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 527, 541–42
(2010) (discussing how the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act modified the language in 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(2) to reflect that it is not required that the defendant present a claim for payment from the
government in order for liability to attach).
170
See TORRAS, supra note 167, at 68 (noting that the majority of qui tam actions filed against
defendants under the False Claims Act are brought by disgruntled employees, spouses or significant
others, and competitors).
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are meritorious, many of them are not the product of a plaintiff’s legitimate
intent to expose fraud.171 Nevertheless, False Claims Act whistleblower
actions continue to expose a substantial amount of fraudulent activity in
the health care industry. Specifically, a 2013 report indicated that the
Department of Justice recovered nearly $5 billion in the 2012 fiscal year
and $3.8 billion in the 2013 fiscal year through False Claims Act actions,
$2.6 billion of which arose from health care fraud recovery in 2013.172
Experience and statistics show that False Claims Act qui tam actions
enable the federal government to recover a huge amount of money that
perpetrators of health care fraud unlawfully withhold from it.173 The annual
increases in funds recovered from False Claims Act actions suggest that
these actions are an important mechanism for government restitution, but
the increases also demonstrate that the government is still failing to deter a
large number of fraud perpetrators.
In a False Claims Act whistleblower action, the government or relator
carries the burden of proof and must prove all elements and damages by a
preponderance of the evidence.174 The United States or relator must prove
that the government’s claim for payment was made and that the claim was
false or fraudulent.175 Courts have split on what level of intent is required
for proving liability in a False Claims Act action,176 but the general
171

See id. at 68–69 (“An obvious danger in these suits is that disgruntled employees can blow
things out of proportion, fabricate activities, or notify the government of their own improper activities
that occurred without the physician’s knowledge. Similarly, patients might pursue a case because they
do not understand a billing statement. . . . It is hoped that attorneys soliciting business will weed out the
real cases from those without merit.”).
172
A. Brian Albritton, DOJ Announces $3.8 Billion in False Claim Act Recoveries for FY 2013,
FALSE CLAIMS ACT L. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2014, 11:33 PM), http://www.falseclaimsactlawblog.com/2014
/01/doj-announces-38-billion-in-false-claim.html (citing Justice News: Justice Department Recovers
$3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013, DEP’T. OF JUST.: OFF. OF PUB. AFFAIRS
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-civ-1352.html).
173
See Mary Jane Wilmoth, DOJ Secures Second Largest Annual Recovery from False Claims
Cases in 2013, WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION BLOG (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.whistle
blowersblog.org/2014/01/articles/false-claims/doj-secures-second-largest-annual-recovery-from-falseclaims-cases-in-2013/ (“Since the inclusion of the Qui Tam provision the detection and prevention of
fraud has risen exponentially. In 1986, prior to the reform, the U.S. government recovered 89 million
dollars from detecting and prosecuting fraud. In 2012, that number rose to 4.95 billion dollars, 68% of
that money was recovered via Qui Tam actions.”).
174
31 U.S.C. § 3731(d) (2012).
175
78 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 4 (2004).
176
Compare United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 634 (4th Cir. 2015) (positing that
False Claims Act liability requires scienter, which “encompasses actual knowledge, deliberate
indifference, and reckless disregard, but does not require proof of specific intent to defraud”), with
United States ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 840–41, 845–46 (3d Cir.
2014) (concluding that requisite intent is knowledge), and United States v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc.,
775 F.3d 255, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2014) (“To meet the ‘requisite scienter’ requirement, the United States
must plead that [defendant] acted with knowledge of the falsity of the statement, which is defined, at a
minimum, as acting in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.’”) (quoting 31
U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012)), and United States ex rel. Grenadyor v. Ukrainian Vill. Pharmacy,
Inc., 772 F.3d 1102, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the requisite intent is that the defendant
know the claim is false), and United States v. Aleff, 772 F.3d 508, 511 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
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consensus is that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge that he was presenting a claim to the government that he knew
to be false.177 The plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant had a
specific intent to defraud the government to establish liability, but it also
cannot rest its proof on the proposition that a defendant should have known
that the claim was fraudulent.178 Thus, the less stringent preponderance-ofthe-evidence burden for the government may alleviate the difficulty of
proving a False Claims Act violation, but the knowledge element can be
particularly difficult to prove. A health care provider’s recording clinical
notes in electronic format can aggravate this difficulty.
B. Health Care Fraud: Criminal Penalties
Federal health care fraud offenses can carry a maximum punishment of
life imprisonment179 and can subject offenders to significant fines as
well.180 Health care providers may be convicted for actions such as
falsifying EHR clinical notes, billing for procedures not actually
performed, billing more than once for the same service, and billing for a
provided service that resulted in an improper kickback to a referral
source.181 Prosecutors may charge numerous statutory violations to
requisite intent “includes actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard”), and Gonzalez
v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The FCA specifically
takes aim at knowing falsity, not at negligent misrepresentation.”).
177
78 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 4 (2004).
178
Id.
179
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012) provides, inter alia, that “if the [health care fraud] violation results in
death, such person [offender] shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for
life, or both.” Id.
180
See, e.g., id. (“(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme
or artifice—(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or (2) to obtain, by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or payment
for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both. If the violation results in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title),
such person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the
violation results in death, such person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years
or for life, or both. (b) With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.”); see also id. §
1035(a) (“Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; or (2) makes any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any materially
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry, in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or
services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”).
181
Compliance Policies: Federal and State False Claims Information, U. MD. REHABILITATION
& ORTHOPAEDIC INST., http://www.umrehabortho.org/compliance/fed-state_false_claim_info.htm (last
visited Jan. 13, 2015); see REBECCA SALTIEL BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD: AUDITING AND
DETECTION GUIDE 40–41 (2d ed. 2012) (listing various forms of provider-side health care fraud,
including clustering, improper modifier codes, kickbacks, and patient dumping); see generally Susan P.
Hanson & Bonnie S. Cassidy, Fraud Control: New Tools, New Potential, 77 J. AHIMA 24 (Mar.
2006), available at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_030850.
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penalize health care fraud, but HIPAA established several specific health
care fraud crimes in various sections of Title 18 of the United States
Code.182 While prosecutors have discretion as to which statutory violation
to charge a perpetrator of health care fraud with committing, Section 1347
of Title 18 is often broadly applicable. In order to prove a Section 1347
violation, a prosecutor must prove, inter alia, that the defendant
“knowingly and willfully execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute, a scheme
or artifice . . . to defraud any health care benefit program . . . in connection
with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or
services.”183 The elements of proof are similar to proving a violation of the
mail fraud statute,184 but they are specific to health care services. Unlike
proving a False Claims Act violation, the prosecutor must prove each
element of a Section 1347 offense beyond a reasonable doubt.185 Prior to
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,186 prosecutors had
to prove that the defendant had a specific intent to defraud to convict him
hcsp?dDocName=bok1_030850 (noting that some examples of health care fraud include providers
making healthy patients come in for unnecessary visits, submitting claims to Medicare for services
more expensive than those actually provided, submitting claims for procedures or visits that never took
place, and prescribing multiple medications to patients who doctor-shop).
182
See 18 U.S.C. § 669(a) (2012) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, or
otherwise without authority converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner, or
intentionally misapplies any of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, property, or other
assets of a health care benefit program, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both . . . .”); id. § 1035(a) (criminalizing false statements relating to health care); id. § 1347
(criminalizing fraud in the context of provision or payment for health care benefits); id. § 1518(a)
(“Whoever willfully prevents, obstructs, misleads, delays or attempts to prevent, obstruct, mislead, or
delay the communication of information or records relating to a violation of a Federal health care
offense to a criminal investigator shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”); see
also Tim Drake et al., Health Care Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1131, 1173 (2013) (discussing
HIPAA’s establishment of federal felonies and misdemeanors related to health care fraud). Section
1347 is labeled as “health care fraud,” Section 669 is labeled as “theft or embezzlement in connection
with health care,” Section 1035 is labeled as “false statements relating to health care matters” and
Section 1518 is labeled as “obstruction of criminal investigations of health care offenses . . . .” Id.
183
18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2012) (emphasis added); Ellen Podgor, The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 Reduces the Criminal Mens Rea Requirement for Healthcare Fraud and
Increases Penalties Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG
(Sept.
6,
2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2010/09/the-patientprotection-and-affordable-care-act-of-2010-reduces-the-criminal-mens-rea-requirement-for.html; see
Drake et al., supra note 182, at 1173 (citing United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 645 (6th Cir. 2008)
(stating the elements required to prove a Section 1347 violation)).
184
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (providing that it shall be a crime to commit mail fraud); Samuel
A. Newman & Robert G. Kidwell, Mail and Wire Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 707, 710–11 (2000)
(“[T]o convict a defendant for violating § 1341, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant perpetrated (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) with the intent to defraud, (3) while using
the United States mails or a private interstate commercial carrier to further that scheme.”).
185
See Model Criminal Jury Instructions: Fraud Offenses – Mail, Wire, Bank and Health Care
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1347), U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 39 (2014),
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2013%20Chap%206%20Fraud%20Offenses%20final%20r
evision%202%202014.pdf (providing the elements and standard of proof for proving a Section 1347
violation).
186
Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20,
21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 36, and 42 U.S.C.).
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187

under Section 1347. The Affordable Care Act abrogated the specific
intent requirement, but prosecutors still have to meet the difficult burden of
proving that a defendant executed a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”188
Thus, a prosecutor may have less difficulty proving health care fraud
insofar as she does not have to prove specific intent, but EHRs can still
make a prosecutor’s job difficult in proving a scheme or artifice to defraud.
C. Electronic Disguises of Health Care Fraud
By design, the HITECH Act’s EHR incentive and meaningful use
programs encourage the widespread use of EHR software among health
care providers. In certain instances, these programs also expressly
encourage health care providers to alter their standard practices in ways
that upend traditional fraud detection. For example, the Stage Two
meaningful use menu objective that requires eligible hospitals to record
electronic progress notes in patient records might make detection of
language suggesting a scheme to defraud more difficult.189 Thus, when
such legislative initiatives expressly encourage providers to use functional
characteristics of EHR technology in ways that change the format of
traditional practices, fraudsters whose practices were becoming more
apparent on paper might seize the opportunity to switch to using new
electronic techniques, requiring prosecutors to go back to square one. At
the very least, prosecutors will have to reassess their strategies. As one
former prosecutor indicated in a recent interview concerning EHRs, some
187
See Podgor, supra note 183 (explaining how the Affordable Care Act loosened the proof of
intent requirement for health care fraud convictions).
188
See 42 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (“[T]he term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”); see also United States v. Colton,
231 F.3d 890, 901 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing the essential proof of mail, bank, wire, and health care
fraud cases and noting that “[w]hat is essential is proof of a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud,’ which can
be shown by deceptive acts or contrivances intended to hide information, mislead, avoid suspicion, or
avert further inquiry into a material matter”); Podgor, supra note 183 (noting that prosecutors still have
to prove that a defendant employed a scheme or artifice to defraud in order to establish guilt).
189
See Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and
Menu Objectives, supra note 62 (requiring eligible hospitals to record electronic notes in patient
records). Specifically, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services require that eligible hospitals’
emergency and inpatient departments record at least one electronic progress note for more than thirty
percent of “unique” patients during its reporting period. Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access
Hospital Meaningful Use Menu Set Measures Measure 2 of 6, CMS.GOV (Oct. 2012),
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/downloads/Stage2
_HospitalMenu_2_ElectronicNotes.pdf. Further, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services state
that electronic notes are “[d]efined as electronic progress notes. CMS will rely on providers own
determinations and guidelines defining when progress notes are necessary to communicate individual
patient circumstances and for coordination with previous documentation of patient observations,
treatments, and/or results in the [EHR].” Id. An example of handwritten notes that might suggest fraud
occurs where a physician writes the exact same things in his clinical notes for multiple patients without
any variation whatsoever. See Christie Moon & Christina Matsiga, 7 Red Flags for Fraud in Medical
Records, ADVANCE HEALTHCARE NETWORK (Feb. 23, 2011), http://health-information.advanceweb
.com/Features/Articles/7-Red-Flags-for-Fraud-in-Medical-Records.aspx (presenting examples of fraud
in medical notes).
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of the automated capabilities of EHR technology, like data-cloning, can
encourage fraud.190 Although some of the functional capabilities of
EHRs—such as cloning, auto-population, and cyber portability—facilitate
efficient and intelligent health care, these capabilities may actually
incentivize some providers to shirk documentation responsibilities. Worse
yet, these capabilities may mask fraudulent practices in unprecedented
ways, making it more difficult for auditors and prosecutors to weed out
perpetrators of health care fraud.
1. Copy-Paste/Cloning Functions
Instead of having to fill out preliminary information about a particular
patient for each separate visit or medical exam, the copy-paste features of
EHRs allow physicians, nurses, and employees to copy information in a
patient’s record from a previous visit and paste it into a new record for a
later visit.191 This is merely one example of how a health care professional
may utilize copy-paste features. The copy-paste function is true to form for
many technological innovations: it is a bonus for improving efficiency and
lowering the cost of health care, but it is also a new potential source for
error and fraud.192
Despite its efficiency benefits, the copy-paste function of EHR
technology can cause providers to commit errors in treatment, which can
be significant in some cases.193 Copying and pasting certain routine
190
See Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, The Role of EHRs in Healthcare Fraud: Former Prosecutor
Outlines the Potential Risks, CAREERS INFO SECURITY (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.careersinfo
security.com/interviews/role-ehrs-in-healthcare-fraud-i-2077 (“Under the HITECH Act’s EHR
incentive program, thousands of healthcare providers have been making the move to digitized record
systems. Unfortunately, some of [sic] [the] automated features of EHRs can make it easier for dishonest
providers to submit padded or fake claims to payers, Ruane says. ‘Many healthcare record systems
contain features to expedite accurate record-keeping, but those same features can be used by fraudsters
to help perpetuate their fraud,’ she says. For example, a healthcare provider could clone data in one
patient record and add it to another record to support submitting claims to Medicare, Medicaid or
private insurers for services not actually provided, says [Maureen] Ruane, who leads a new healthcare
litigation, investigations and compliance practice . . . .”).
191
See Justin M. Weis & Paul C. Levy, Copy, Paste, and Cloned Notes in Electronic Health
Records: Prevalence, Benefits, Risks, and Best Practice Recommendations, 145 CHEST J. 632, 633–34
(2014) (discussing the various benefits that come with the ability to copy and paste information in
EHRs).
192
See Erin McCann, CMS Called out for EHR Fraud Failings, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Jan. 9,
2014), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/cms-called-out-ehr-fraud-failings (reporting that the
Office of the Inspector General highlighted copy-and-paste functionality as a common means for
committing fraud in EHRs).
193
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Masor, Electronic Medical Records and E-Discovery: With New
Technology Come New Challenges, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 245, 260 (2013) (“A study also
identified copying and pasting as a major source of electronic medical record documentation errors.
This often occurred when medical staff would copy and paste a portion of text without properly
proofreading it to ensure that it was still accurate. An example includes writing that a ‘patient walked
for the first time’ repeated for three days.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing C.R.
Wier et al., Direct Text Entry in Electronic Progress Notes, 42 METHODS INFO. MED. 61, 63, 67
(2003)) (discussing the widespread use of copy-paste function by clinicians and provider employees in
documenting medical treatment and the ensuing errors that occur)).
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information in EHRs can be harmless, but in other instances, the practice
can create misleading treatment records.194 One particular study found that
nine percent of the total amount of electronic medical progress notes taken
for patients visiting Department of Veterans Affairs facilities were
copied.195 The same study found that of those copied notes, sixty-three
percent were copied by human authors and not by a template-generated
software program.196 Thus, the widespread practice of human users
copying and pasting electronic medical progress notes—as one of the Stage
Two meaningful use objectives explicitly encourages197—might actually be
a cause for concern for prosecutors in light of the likelihood that most
human users of EHR technology will copy and paste information in EHR
progress notes. Such copying and pasting might be completely innocent as
well, but aside from fraud concerns, the practice still creates problems for
health care outcomes.198 Further, widespread copying and pasting by
human health care providers can also create discovery issues in medical
malpractice litigation and fraud prosecution, particularly when the identity
of a transcriber is in question in a large health care facility.199
The copy-paste function increases the potential for error in clinical
recordkeeping and creates difficulties for litigators in detecting the source
of entry. In early December 2013, the Office of the Inspector General
released a report that shed light on the fraud problems that copy-paste
technology creates in EHR technology.200 In the report, the Inspector
194
See Kenric W. Hammond et al., Are Electronic Medical Records Trustworthy? Observations
on Copying, Pasting and Duplication, 2003 AMIA ANN. SYMP. PROC. 269, 269, 272. (discussing a
study of human and template-generated copying in electronic medical progress notes for patients
treated in U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs health care facilities between 1993 and 2002 and
finding that of the 29,386 notes from 243 cases examined, there were 2,645 copied notes (9% of total
notes)).
195
Id. at 272.
196
Id.
197
See Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and
Menu Objectives, supra note 62 (providing that eligible hospitals are encouraged to “record electronic
notes in patient records” in order to achieve Stage Two meaningful use).
198
See Anne Zieger, EMR Copy-and-Paste May Lead to Fraud, Errors, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Dec.
10, 2013), http://www.healthcaredive.com/news/emr-copy-and-paste-may-lead-to-fraud-errors/204627/
(“While cutting and pasting data from one template or field to another is seldom an attempt to defraud
anyone—it’s just a workaround to save time—it’s still a problem hospitals need to address
systematically. Simply pushing off responsibility onto the end users doesn’t address the issue
adequately, though. Ultimately, if clinicians are feeling so squeezed for time that they’re creating
inaccuracies by cutting and pasting, maybe the EMR user interface is the problem.”).
199
See Masor, supra note 193, at 261 (citing Ralph C. Losey & Kristen A. Foltz, Electronic
Medical Records: What Are Some of the Practical Issues Lawyers Should Be Aware of During
Discovery and Litigation?, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (June 2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content
/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/Losey.html) (pointing out the legal conundrums
that copy-paste practices with EHRs create for litigators trying to identify a tortfeasor in medical
malpractice cases).
200
See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T HEALTH HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-11-00570,
NOT ALL RECOMMENDED FRAUD SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN HOSPITAL EHR
TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 2013) [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.] (presenting the findings of a study
that involved interviewing over eight hundred hospitals that received Medicare incentive payments to
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General indicated that it had contracted with RTI International, a health
information technology research institute, to make recommendations
regarding protection of EHRs against fraud in connection with the
report.202 The Inspector General surveyed 864 hospitals and found that
“only about one quarter of hospitals had policies regarding the use of the
copy-paste feature in EHR technology, which, if used improperly, could
pose a fraud vulnerability.”203 The report further indicated that of the
hospitals that had audit log technology, only forty-four percent “recorded
the method of data entry (e.g., copy-paste, direct text entry, speech
recognition) when data [were] entered into the EHR.”204 Sixty-one percent
of the hospitals placed the burden of ensuring accuracy of the copied and
pasted information on the providers using the EHR.205 Fifty-one percent of
the hospitals also reported that they were unable to disable, restrict, or
customize copy-paste functions, which several EHR vendors also
confirmed in the survey.206
As the Inspector General’s report suggests, copy-paste features place
an enormous amount of confidence in the human EHR user to record
accurate information. This confidence can be particularly problematic
when such a user is prone to human error or intent on defrauding patients
or the government. According to the Inspector General’s report, the
Research Triangle Institute recommended that hospitals and government
investigators use audit logs to detect misuse of the copy-paste feature of
EHR technology.207 Audit log technology is one method of detecting fraud
in copied and pasted EHR notes, but as the report also indicated, not all
audit logs can determine the method of data entry, which is essential for
determining if information was copied and pasted.208
From a health care fraud perspective, a prosecutor still has to prove
that a defendant “knowingly and willfully executed . . . a scheme or artifice
use certified EHR technology and concluding that many hospitals had not been adequately employing
anti-fraud measures such as audit logs to address fraud vulnerabilities that may be facilitated by EHR
features such as copy-paste functionality).
201
See Health IT and Electronic Health Information Exchange, RTI INT’L, http://www.rti.org/
page.cfm/Health_Information_Technology (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (indicating that its clients include
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
202
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 200, at i.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 14.
205
Id.
206
Id.; see Robert Lowes, Fraud-Wary Feds to Regulate EHR Copy-and-Paste Function,
MEDSCAPE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/817604 (“The OIG report suggests
that many hospitals may have a hard time controlling the use of copy-and-paste. Roughly half of the
hospitals surveyed said that they are unable to disable, restrict, or otherwise customize the copy-andpaste function of their EHR systems.”).
207
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 200, at 14.
208
See id. at 9 (“[H]ospital audit logs are less likely to record the method of data entry (e.g., direct
text entry, speech recognition, automated) or the original date, time, and user identification when data
are copy-pasted.”).
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209

to defraud.” Prosecutors and federal investigators presumably had more
clues to detect the requisite knowledge or scheme to defraud in
handwritten medical progress notes, seeing as they could have identified a
particular transcriber’s handwriting or commonly used phraseology.210
Provided that EHR technology does not identify the transcriber, copy-paste
technology increasingly will deprive prosecutors of these clues in the
HITECH Act era: it will allow transcribers to use another transcriber’s
phraseology and it will record the borrowed language in standardized
handwriting. Not only will prosecutors be unable to identify a transcriber
by handwriting, but they also will likely not be certain that the recorder is
the actual person indicated in the EHR.211 The aforementioned Veteran
Affairs study authors noted the particular difficulty in detecting human
copying edits in EHRs without the assistance of detection software.212
Copy-paste technology not only might create obstacles for identifying
the transcriber, but it also may mislead prosecutors into proving that a
provider is willfully executing a scheme to defraud when they are actually
using the feature carelessly. For example, a transcriber examining a patient
over a course of many years may copy and paste information from the
patient’s first visit into every subsequent recording in the EHR.213 Thus,
while symptoms observed on the first appointment may have been no
longer present after a certain amount of visits, they still appear in the
recorded notes for all of the patient’s visits.214 This phenomenon can be
particularly problematic when EHR progress notes continue across

209
210

Podgor, supra note 183 (emphasis added).
See generally Moon & Matsiga, supra note 189 (presenting examples of fraud in medical

notes).
211
This proposition relies on the presumption that the EHR technology indicates the identity of
the transcriber. Even then, a prosecutor cannot be certain that a previous user had not logged out and
another person recorded the notes under their name. This is one way in which electronic progress notes
might actually be counterproductive as opposed to paper notes. Of course, it may be the case that EHR
technology might eventually permit clinicians to record handwritten notes in electronic format, but this
does not yet seem to be a pervasive feature in EHRs.
212
See Hammond et al., supra note 194, at 272–73 (“Unlike machine copy-artifact, human
copying is hard to detect without technical aid. . . . The variety, creativity and subtlety of human
copying efforts were broad. Without Copyfind-VA it would have been very difficult to distinguish
valid from invalid records. With it, many innocent-appearing records raised doubts.”).
213
See Appropriate Use of the Copy and Paste Functionality in Electronic Health Records, AM.
HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N 4 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/doc
uments/ahima/bok1_050621.pdf (“However, a number of challenges and risks associated with the
copy/paste function have been identified. These include: Inaccurate or outdated information; Redundant
information, which makes it difficult to identify the current information . . . .”); see also Robert E.
Hirschtick, Copy-and-Paste, 295 JAMA 2335, 2335 (2006) (“Daily progress notes become
progressively longer and contain senescent information. The admitting diagnostic impression, long
since discarded, is dutifully noted day after day. Last month’s echocardiogram report takes up
permanent residence in the daily results section. Complicated patients are on ‘post-op day 2’ for weeks.
One wonders how utilization review interprets such statements.”).
214
See Hirschtick, supra note 213 (noting how copy-paste functionality can exacerbate the
accumulation of erroneous information in patient progress notes).
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separate hospital admissions because it misleads other providers.215 A
different provider working off of a previous provider’s inaccurate progress
notes will then bill Medicare—or the patient herself—for procedures that
were not medically necessary, which can be proven as fraud.216 A
prosecutor might be misled into thinking that the provider is willfully
executing a scheme to defraud when, in fact, he was just basing treatment
on inaccurate notes that an earlier provider recorded in an EHR. Of course,
the meaningful use objective mandating that patients have more control
over their own records might eliminate this problem,217 but they are not
immune from misinterpretation either. The Department of Justice and the
Inspector General have already expressed a strong intent to punish fraud
enabled by copy-paste technology in EHRs,218 but its capabilities have
enabled some fraudulent health care providers to circumvent the law.
2. Auto-Population Functions
Another functional characteristic of EHR technology that presents
obstacles for fraud detection and that enables perpetrators to commit fraud
is the auto-fill, or auto-population feature. Similar to the copy-paste feature
in many EHR software programs, auto-population features aim to make
medical documentation quicker and effortless, yet they easily propagate
inaccurate and fraudulent information. Auto-population technology
automatically inputs data into an EHR when a user clicks an option on a
drop-down menu, checks off a box, or types a template response into a
data-entry field.219 If the user is short on time, he may simply check off one
215
See id. (“EMR also allows the copy-and-paste function to be used across hospital admissions,
so that the last note from the previous admission can be used, with additions, as the first note for a
readmission. Moreover, EMR encourages everyone to copy-and-paste the notes of everyone else so that
notes become the same from author to author as well as from day to day. Even consultants are
assimilated into the oneness of the EMR Borg. A cardiology consultant recently copied-and-pasted the
intern’s note into his own, even including ‘consult cardiology in AM’ in his recommendations. Perhaps
he meant consult a more thoughtful cardiologist.”).
216
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(E) (2012) (providing, inter alia, that a provider who files
reimbursement claims to the federal government for health care procedures that the provider “knows or
should know are not medically necessary” is liable for civil penalties).
217
See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (providing that Stage 2 requirements aim to give
patients more control over their own EHRs).
218
See Robert Radick, EMRs: The New Health Care Fraud Frontier?, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2012,
4:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/12/04/emrs-the-new-health-care-fraud-frontier/
(“Attorney General Holder and Secretary Sebelius bluntly warned in their letter that ‘[l]aw enforcement
will take appropriate steps to pursue health care providers who misuse electronic health records to bill
for services never provided.’”) (quoting Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
& Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Richard Umbdenstock, President
& CEO, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Charles N. Kahn, III, President & CEO, Fed’n of Am. Hosps., Steve
Wartman, President & CEO, Ass’n of Academic Health Ctrs., Darrell G. Kirch, President & CEO,
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., & Bruce Siegel, President & CEO, Nat’l Ass’n of Pub. Hosps. & Health
Sys. (Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012
/09/25/business/25medicare-doc.html).
219
See Donald A. Wochna, Electronic Medical Records: Ready or Not, Here They Come!, OHIO
STATE BAR ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/LawYouCan
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box, allow data to auto-populate in other fields, and move onto another
task.220 This common practice leads to over-documentation, which “is the
practice of inserting false or irrelevant documentation to create the
appearance of support for billing higher level services.”221 Another
instance of over-documentation might occur if there are template responses
in an EHR input interface that do not entirely encapsulate a patient’s
condition. Instead of taking time to note all of a patient’s complaints or
symptoms, a careless physician or employee may simply type in a template
response for one data field that auto-populates other unnecessary fields,
which leads to over-billing.222 Not only do such practices produce errors in
treatment and shelter fraud, but they also damage the integrity of diagnosis
techniques.223 While these common practices may be innocuous—just like
copy-paste features—they can disguise intentional fraud.
Auto-population-induced over-documentation224 usually manifests
Use/Pages/Electronic-Medical-Records-Ready-or-Not-Here-They-Come.aspx
(answering
basic
questions about EHR technology and pertinent legal issues); see also David B. Troxel, Electronic
Health Record Malpractice Risks, DOCTORS CO., http://www.thedoctors.com/KnowledgeCenter
/PatientSafety/articles/CON_ID_003743 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (“Computer-assisted documentation
[for EHRs] uses point-and-click lists, drop-down menus, auto-fill, templates, and canned text to bypass
natural language and produce structured progress notes.”).
220
See generally AHIMA, Integrity of the Healthcare Record: Best Practices for EHR
Documentation, 84 J. AHIMA 58, 58–60 (2013), available at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups
/public/documents/ahima/bok1_050286.hcsp?dDocName=bok1_050286 [hereinafter Integrity of the
Healthcare Record] (assessing how auto-population features in EHR technology can damage the
integrity of documentation).
221
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-11-00571,
CMS AND ITS CONTRACTORS HAVE ADOPTED FEW PROGRAM INTEGRITY PRACTICES TO ADDRESS
VULNERABILITIES IN EHRS 2 (2014) [hereinafter CMS AND ITS CONTRACTORS].
222
See, e.g., Dawn Landry, Audit Issues with Templated Documentation, GILL COMPLIANCE
SOLUTIONS BLOG (Oct. 28, 2013), http://gillcompliance.com/blog/comments/audit-issues-withtemplated-documentation (“An EMR system may allow a provider to ‘point and click’ through bullet
points on a template unknowingly navigating to a higher level of service. For example, clicking through
[sic] a template to obtain a comprehensive history and exam for an established patient who is
presenting for a straightforward problem, such as an insect bite with no other complaints . . . .”).
223
See, e.g., Pat Janakowski, Electronic Medical Records: Friend or Foe?, LABOR NOTES (July
16, 2013), http://www.labornotes.org/2013/07/electronic-medical-records-friend-or-foe (noting that
nursing is “[n]ot an [e]xact [s]cience” and stating that “[w]e [nurses] didn’t go into nursing in order to
fill in contextual menus to comply with reimbursement requirements”); see also Laura Roberts, Partner,
HC Healthcare Consulting, & Amy Bailey-Muckler, Dir. of Compliance at Catholic Health East,
Address at the Connecticut Hospital Association’s 2013 Corporate Compliance Conference: Electronic
Health Records—Auditing Quality and Compliance (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://www.health
lawyers.org/events/programs/materials/documents/fc12/205_muckler_roberts_slides.pdf
(“The
computer may become a barrier between the doctor and the patient. When the doctor fills in a computer
template, it may divert attention from the patient, limit interactive conversation, and restrict creative
thinking.”).
224
This phenomenon is referred to as “upcoding,” which is defined as “[a] fraudulent practice in
which provider services are billed for higher CPT procedure codes than were actually performed,
resulting in a higher payment by Medicare or 3rd-party payors.” Medical Dictionary: Upcoding, FREE
DICTIONARY, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/upcoding (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
CPT codes are codes assigned to different medical procedures that can be billed to Medicare. “CPT”
stands for Current Procedural Terminology. Trisha Torrey, What Are CPT Codes?, ABOUT.COM,
http://patients.about.com/od/costsconsumerism/a/cptcodes.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2014).
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itself in the billing and insurance contexts. For example, if a patient is
required to fill in a bubble sheet for a review of her systems, indicating a
current level of pain on a number scale from one to ten but there is no
option for “no complaints,” the patient might simply not fill in any of the
corresponding bubbles. 225 If that sheet also has a box for indicating that
there are no complaints and the patient fails to fill it out, a hurried
technician may scan the sheet into EHR format, which automatically
generates corresponding entries of “negative for pain” in the pain scale,
suggesting that the patient was examined.226 Based on this information, the
provider subsequently might bill Medicare for procedures that it did not
actually perform. Further, this excessive information will continue in the
chain of treatment, particularly in the interoperable EHR network that the
HITECH Act strives to achieve.227 Auto-population technology also
permits fraud perpetrators to set an abnormally high default reimbursement
rate for all visits and to rely on hurried administrative employees to
downcode the level if the patient’s visit requires.228 In the busy practice of
health care, it is not hard to imagine that administrative employees forget
to do this, causing Medicare to be billed at an abnormally high rate. These
phenomena could be pure products of carelessness. On the other hand, they
present loopholes for fraudsters to exploit. Ultimately, upcoding Medicare
claims constitutes fraud within the ambit of the False Claims Act,229 and
prosecutors might not be able to tell the difference between pure
negligence and a scheme to defraud.
While over-documentation fraud has been easier to detect than its

225
See, e.g., Cheryl L. Toth, Auto-Population Gone Wild: EMR Documentation Can Create Risky
Record Keeping, AM. ACAD. PROF. CODERS (Feb. 17, 2010), http://news.aapc.com/index.php/2010
/02/auto-population-gone-wild/ (portraying a similar bubble sheet auto-fill example).
226
Id.; see Integrity of the Healthcare Record, supra note 220 (“For example, the automatic
generation of common negative findings within a review of systems for each body area or organ system
may result in a higher level of service delivered, unless the provider documents any pertinent positive
results and deletes the incorrect auto-generated entries.”).
227
See How Does the HITECH Act Address Barriers to Information Exchange?, HEALTH IT.GOV,
http://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/faqs/how-does-hitech-act-address-barriersinformation-exchange (last updated Jan. 15, 2013) (“The HITECH Act focuses on ‘interoperability,’
meaning that policies, programs, and incentives must aim for EHR software and systems that can share
information with other EHR software and systems.”). “An interoperable EHR is one that permits the
exchange of patient health information among disparate clinicians and other authorized entities in real
time and under stringent security, privacy, and other protections.” WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR. ET AL.,
MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW 448 (4th ed. 2006).
228
See, e.g., Julie Malida, Health Insurance Fraud Gets Easier; So Should Stopping It, INS.
NETWORKING NEWS, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 33 (providing a similar example).
229
See United States ex rel. Harris v. Bernad, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–5 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying the
defendant physicians’ motion to dismiss the Government’s qui tam action alleging that they upcoded
claims to Medicare in violation of the False Claims Act); see also Preventing Fraud in Your Electronic
Medical Records, SUNERA HEALTHCARE (Jan. 2, 2014), https://healthcare.sunera.com/blog/preventingfraud-electronic-medical-record-emr/ (“Over-documentation leads to upcoding, and submitting an
upcoded claim is a fraud.”).
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230

copy-and-paste counterpart, prosecutors still shoulder the same essential
burden of proving an intentional and knowing “scheme or artifice to
defraud” to successfully convict a perpetrator of health care fraud.231 The
auto-population feature of EHRs is also problematic for detecting fraud
because not only can fraudster providers hide behind the mask of
electronic documentation, but they can also cover up their tracks. Jennifer
Trussell, special advisor to the Inspector General, stressed the difficulty of
tracking EHR technology with auto-population features—especially
without audit-trailing software—when she noted that investigators of
electronic health care fraud “don’t know whether the doctor checked or
unchecked, whether it was the biller, the receptionist or some guy on the
street.”232 If audit logs cannot detect when a perpetrator made fraudulent
alterations in an EHR record, fraudsters have a green light to cover up a
scheme or artifice to defraud by simply unchecking numerous boxes and
saving the records in a patient’s EHR.233 In a practice using paper medical
records, if suspect providers subsequently correct errors to cover up
fraudulent information, they typically cross out information and make
corrections.234 In a practice using EHRs that have template and autopopulation functionality, a provider with aims to defraud can make
encrypted changes, which are much more complex to detect.235

230
See, e.g., Kyle Murphy, OIG Report Shows Flaws in CMS Detection of EHR-Related Fraud,
EHR INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://ehrintelligence.com/2014/01/09/oig-report-shows-flaws-incms-detection-of-ehr-related-fraud/ (“On the subject of the two most common forms of EHR-related
fraud, overdocumentation and copy-paste language, the CMS contractors display various degrees of
competency for identifying either practice. Although overdocumentation in EHRs was more easily
detected . . . copied language in these records eluded half of all the contractors surveyed.”).
231
18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2012); see Podgor, supra note 183 (noting that although the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 relaxed the mens rea requirement for the federal health
care fraud offense, prosecutors still must prove a scheme or artifice to defraud in order to convict a
defendant).
232
See Alicia Caramenico, Healthcare Fraud Alert: 7 Trends to Watch, FIERCEHEALTHPAYER
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.fiercehealthpayer.com/story/healthcare-fraud-alert-7-trends-watch/201311-20 (“The increasing adoption of electronic health records has led healthcare into an era of ‘perfectly
documented fraud,’ according to Trussell. Many EHR systems, for example, allow autopopulation to
automatically check what the clinician did to make the diagnosis and uncheck what he or she didn’t
do.” (quoting Jennifer Trussell)).
233
Id.
234
See Losey & Foltz, supra note 199 (discussing EHR error correction implications for
discovery purposes).
235
See Oracle White Paper: HITECH’s Challenge to the Health Care Industry, ORACLE 7–9, 14–
15 (Oct. 2011), http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/security/owp-security-hipaa-hitech522515.pdf (discussing the specialized area of data encryption in EHRs and noting that even though
encryption is essential for protecting the security of protected health information, it can also contribute
to the complexities involved in maintaining the integrity of EHRs).

1144

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1103

3. Cyber Portability
One common characteristic of EHRs that raises fraud concerns is their
portability across cyber media, particularly in nationwide information
networks.236 The HITECH Act guards against some of these fraud concerns
with components such as the data breach rule and protected health
information security regulations. However, prosecutors should be wary of
the fraud implications that the proliferation of EHRs in a nationwide
network have, particularly with respect to medical identity theft. While
medical identity theft may not be unique to EHRs, the proliferation of
EHRs certainly may change its habitat.
The Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team
provides recommendations on how to spot health care fraud and devotes
significant attention to medical identity theft.237 The increased nationwide
use of EHRs propelled protected health information security concerns to
the forefront of policy debate. Medical identity theft is a key element
driving these concerns.238 The Attorney General of California, Kamala D.
Harris, defines medical identity theft as “the fraudulent use of an
individual’s identifying information in a health care setting to obtain
medical services or goods, or for financial gain.”239 Attorney General
Harris also notes that medical identity theft occurs in numerous ways, but
one common way is insider abuse of access to patient EHRs.240 This occurs
when employees, nurses, and physicians with unlawful motives use
patients’ protected health information to obtain insurance proceeds or bill
for higher services.241 The effects of this crime can be particularly
devastating because they can create fictitious information that follows the
actual patient and can harm them long after the theft occurs.242
According to a 2013 survey, the Medical Identity Fraud Alliance
discovered that medical identity theft affects a large segment of the U.S.
236
See David Schultz, As Patients’ Records Go Digital, Theft and Hacking Problems Grow,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 3, 2012), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/electronic-health-recordstheft-hacking/ (claiming that the proliferation of EHRs increases the risk of medical data breaches,
which “can lead to everything from identity theft to billing fraud to blackmail”).
237
See Common Scams and Identity Theft, STOPMEDICAREFRAUD.GOV, http://www.stopmedicare
fraud.gov/preventfraud/scams-identity-theft/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (explaining
common forms of health care fraud).
238
See Kamala D. Harris, Medical Identity Theft: Recommendations for the Age of Electronic
Medical Records, CAL. DEP’T. JUST. i (Oct. 2013) (noting that the “escalation” EHRs has made medical
identity theft a crucial area of concern with respect to care quality).
239
Id. at 1.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
See Medical Identity Theft, WORLD PRIVACY F., http://www.worldprivacyforum.org
/category/med-id-theft/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (“[Medical identity theft] is also the most difficult
[identity theft crime] to fix after the fact, because victims have limited rights and recourses. Medical
identity theft typically leaves a trail of falsified information in medical records that can plague victims’
medical and financial lives for years.”).
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243

population. The survey involved nearly eight hundred adults who selfreported that they or a family member were victims of medical identity
theft.244 Further, the survey’s researchers found that while there were
approximately 313,000 medical identity theft victims reported in 2012,
they estimated that there were 1.84 million victims in 2013.245 The
Alliance projected out-of-pocket cost to these 1.84 million victims to be
twelve billion dollars.246 Over fifty percent of the adults surveyed indicated
that they suffered financially from the theft, which came in the form of
required reimbursements to providers who paid identity thieves, lapsed
insurance coverage, and increased insurance premiums.247 The survey’s
findings regarding some of the causes of the theft shed some light on how
EHRs may increase vulnerability. The survey posited some of the
following occurrences as the most likely causes of medical identity theft: a
family member took the victim’s personal medical credentials without
consent (28%); a health care provider used the victim’s ID to conduct
fraudulent billing (22%); personal information was inadvertently provided
to a scam e-mail or website (8%); a health care provider, insurer, or other
related organization had a data breach (7%); and an employee working in
the health care provider’s office stole the victim’s health information
(5%).248 Further, 14% of the participants reported that they did not know
the cause of their breach.249
These results are startling in light of the massive proliferation of EHRs
encouraged by the HITECH Act. One attractive feature of EHR technology
is its cyber portability, its ability to be viewable at the stroke of a key or a
click of the mouse.250 A large majority of medical identity theft reported in
the Medical Identity Fraud Alliance survey arose from instances where this
same portability is a factor, such as instances involving a data breach, a
provider that fraudulently bills, a fraudulent website or e-mail address, and
an employee who steals.251 EHRs might actually reduce a victim’s
vulnerability to theft in situations where family members stole medical
credentials, but one of the meaningful use objectives for Stage Two is to

243
Medical ID Theft Rates, Costs Continue to Climb as Consumers Fail to Protect Their Info or
to Report Crime—Report, PHIPRIVACY.NET (Sept. 12, 2013, 7:11 AM), http://www.phiprivacy.net/
medical-id-theft-rates-costs-continue-to-climb-as-consumers-fail-to-protect-their-info-or-to-reportcrime-report/ [hereinafter Medical ID Theft Rates].
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
See ROACH, JR. ET AL., supra note 227, at 446 (defining a component of an EHR system as
“[i]mmediate electronic access to person- and population-level information by authorized users”).
251
See Medical ID Theft Rates, supra note 243, at fig.13 (positing the most likely causes of
medical identity theft).
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give patients more access to, and control over, their own records.252 This
raises the question: what is stopping family members from having access
to these EHRs? Further, while employees with fraudulent aims might have
been unable to steal large folders filled with patient X-rays, they might
have much less difficulty stealing a thumb drive or burning protected
health information onto a compact disc. Lastly, in light of some of the
massive data breaches reported pursuant to the HITECH Act’s data breach
rule,253 the data breach causes of medical identity theft are also troubling.
Thus, the cyber portability of EHRs may expose protected health
information to medical identity theft in new ways that prosecutors must
recognize. The HITECH Act’s data breach rule is an important tool for
prosecutors to understand how data breaches occur,254 but this only sheds
light on one limb of the multi-limbed beast that is medical identity theft.
Ultimately, prosecutors must be able to follow stolen protected health
information to its end destination where end-users use it to perpetrate
fraud.
IV. PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that the widespread use of EHRs is currently in progress, the
federal government has already begun to address some of the
aforementioned issues related to fraud in EHRs. Nevertheless, detecting
and prosecuting fraud in the world of EHRs is still in its infancy, and a
flexible yet responsive plan is necessary to rein in health care fraud in its
various forms.
A. Establish Guidelines and Promote Technology Education
One of the main concerns raised in the Office of the Inspector
General’s January 2014 report was the lack of guidance that the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services had provided to Medicare contractors on
how to implement policies for detecting fraud in EHRs.255 As the Office of
the Inspector General’s report suggests, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services should increase efforts in providing guidelines for
detecting fraudulent information in EHRs.256 Moreover, guidelines should
252
See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (providing that one of the Stage Two criteria focuses on
more patient-controlled data and one of the Stage Three criteria focuses on increasing patient access to
self-management tools for their EHRs).
253
See supra notes 143–58 and accompanying text (reporting data breaches affecting more than
five hundred persons).
254
42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012).
255
See CMS AND ITS CONTRACTORS, supra note 221, at 9 (noting that the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services have not adequately communicated with contractors about detecting fraud in
EHR-based claims).
256
See id. at 8 tbl.3 (reporting that, inter alia, only one of the eight participating Medicare
Administrative Contractors, one of four participating Recovery Audit Contractors, and none of the six
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explain the variety of features that EHR software provides and how these
features can help to perpetrate fraud. Attorneys, patients, health care
providers, and their business associates should proactively educate
themselves about EHR functional features and the ways in which such
features can mask fraudulent billing or clinical practices. If patients,
providers, and prosecutors become shrewder with EHR technology, they
will be more adept in recognizing fraud and stopping it via qui tam actions,
criminal prosecution, or internal audit proceedings.257 The standardization
of EHR formats will facilitate creating guidelines for fraud detection, but
central authorities like the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
should always stay abreast of new technologies that develop in the world
of health information. These central authorities should also share their
knowledge with all anti-fraud entities with which they cooperate.
B. Strengthen Coordinated Enforcement Approaches
In addition to learning about the functional characteristics of EHRs,
anti-fraud authorities should coordinate their efforts with numerous parties
to enhance their fraud detection strategies. These anti-fraud authorities
should also embrace the power of data-analysis technology in their
detection efforts. In this vein, the federal government has already made
some progress, as evidenced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services’ Fraud Prevention System258 and the Health Care Fraud
Prevention and Enforcement Action Team. Investigators who seek to
detect fraud should work together in these kinds of multipronged
enforcement organizations because they are most effective in detecting and
stopping fraud in its evolving forms.
Programs like the Fraud Prevention System that use predictive

participating Zone Program Integrity Contractors received guidance from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services on over-documentation in EHRs).
257
See Lisa A. Eramo, Stopping Fraud: Detecting and Preventing Fraud in the e-Health Era, 82
J. AHIMA 28, 30 (2011) (suggesting that health care providers and patients should become more
educated on how to detect fraud in EHRs). In this vein, Congress has already enacted legislation that
calls upon the Department of Health and Human Services to conduct a nationwide education initiative
with respect to the security and privacy of protected health information, 42 U.S.C. § 17933 (2012), but
this Note urges that such initiatives should also focus on EHR fraud detection and prevention.
258
See Fraud Prevention Toolkit: CMS Fraud Prevention Initiative, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.
gov/Outreach-and-Education/Outreach/Partnerships/FraudPreventionToolkit.html (last updated July 29,
2013, 10:43 AM) (“CMS is also using a predictive analytic technology called the Fraud Prevention
System to identify the highest risk claims for fraud, waste and abuse in real time that has stopped,
prevented or identified $115 million in payments, resulting in an estimated $3 for every $1 spent in its
very first year.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7m(b) (2012) (requiring the HHS Secretary to use
“predictive analytics technologies [that] shall—(1) capture Medicare provider and Medicare
beneficiary activities . . . in order to—(A) identify and analyze Medicare provider networks, provider
billing patterns, and beneficiary utilization patterns; and (B) identify and detect any such patterns and
networks that represent a high risk of fraudulent activity”).
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259

analytics to uncover fraud are crucial in the age of EHR technology. The
government’s adoption of fraud detection via informatics represents a step
in the right direction because law enforcement officials will ultimately be
better able to pierce the veil that EHRs create for fraud that was once
blatant on paper. Law enforcement authorities should also develop,
enhance, and use audit logs, which can accurately determine who accessed
an EHR and when changes were made to it.260 Furthermore, lawmakers and
law enforcement authorities should incentivize EHR software vendors to
implement anti-fraud technology into their products. Specifically,
authorities could require vendors to make the baseline settings of their
EHR software include user-identification features that require every user to
enter clear identity information every time he or she accesses an EHR.261
While such measures may require fraud investigators to become better
versed in predictive health informatics—which is arguably a more cryptic
means of detecting health care fraud—prosecutors and law enforcement
officials eventually can learn to understand it and begin to notice trends,
outliers, and red flags. It is also important to note, however, that anti-fraud
authorities must be on the same page with each other, considering how
complicated and interconnected the world of health information is at this
point in time. Further, given that private citizens can bring qui tam actions
against suspected perpetrators of fraud, the reliability of information
provided to investigators and prosecutors should always be evaluated. This
is why collaborative efforts involving multiple entities would be most
useful in uncovering and punishing fraud.
On the prosecution-side of coordinated enforcement efforts,
prosecutors must tailor their presentation of evidence, their experts, and
their legal arguments to present a willful and knowing execution of a
fraudulent scheme or artifice to defraud. Perhaps this is the greatest
259
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ predictive analytics basically evaluate
Medicare claims in real time and compute a risk score based upon various metrics like type of provider,
type of service, identity of beneficiary, and patterns in claims. The Centers will then investigate
potential fraud based upon that risk score. Linda Rosencrance, How Predictive Analytics Help Fight
Healthcare Fraud, TIBCOSPOTFIRE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://spotfire.tibco.com/blog/?p=8738.
260
See Masor, supra note 193, at 254 (discussing the utility of audit trails in determining EHR
authenticity).
261
Cf. AHIMA, Privacy and Security Audits of Electronic Health Information, 88 J. AHIMA 54,
54 (2014) (“In a perfect world, access controls alone would ensure the privacy and security of
electronic protected health information (ePHI). However, the complexities of today’s healthcare
environment make it extremely challenging to limit access to the minimum information necessary that
members of the workforce require in order to perform their jobs. In smaller organizations and
community-based hospitals, employees may perform multiple functions, each of which requires
different levels of access. Without having access to specific portions of every patient’s health record,
employees’ effectiveness could be significantly inhibited, and patient care and safety could be
compromised. Organizations must develop security audits and related policies and procedures to hold
members of the workforce accountable for their actions when accessing ePHI through the electronic
health record (EHR).”).
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challenge of all, but it might be more feasible as legal precedents emerge
and as prosecutors become more adept at recognizing fraud in EHR
format.262 Prosecutors must get creative in presenting circumstantial
evidence as well.263 For example, prosecutors must be able to take a step
back from the particularized data contained in EHRs and the corresponding
billing documents.264 Instead, prosecutors should present evidence
concerning how a suspected fraud perpetrator’s EHRs compare to those of
other providers in the industry or in the same geographic area. In this light,
prosecutors should be able to transcend the seemingly legitimate
appearance that fraudulent records may have in electronic format.
Policymakers should also work in tandem with law enforcement
officials and prosecutors and should be mindful of how legislative
initiatives like the HITECH Act’s EHR incentive and meaningful use
programs may perpetuate fraud. In light of United States Senator Orrin
Hatch’s statement at the Committee on Finance’s July 2013 hearing on
health information technology, legislators should not be afraid to “push the
pause button” on legislative initiatives incentivizing overtly beneficial
technology.265 While stopping the meaningful use program is not
advisable, legislators should take Senator Hatch’s sentiment to heart and
look at the big picture surrounding legislative goals. In short, lawmakers
262
Prosecutors should also rely more heavily on billing or treatment standards in a provider’s
particular health care industry to present evidence of abnormal practices suggesting a scheme to
defraud. For a useful example of how a prosecutor proved a physician’s scheme to defraud based upon
medical necessity standards in the physician’s industry, see United States v. Patel, 485 F. App’x 702
(5th Cir. 2012).
263
See id. at 708 (“Intent to defraud is typically proven with circumstantial evidence and
inferences.” (citing United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1996)). For an example of a
prosecutor’s successful presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove that a defendant knowingly
participated in a scheme to defraud Medicaid, see United States v. Essien, 530 F. App’x 291, 299–300
(5th Cir. 2013).
264
See, e.g., BUSCH, supra note 181, at 273–74 (“An electronic interoperable healthcare market
opens the doors to tremendous opportunities in the area of waste, fraud, and abuse. . . . The market does
not move forward with respect to standards, for example, simple analyses of how many patients are
being treated for a particular diagnosis. The universal billing form created this opportunity by forcing
the market to submit the content of the bill in a consistent format among all providers. The
standardization of the universal billing form along with sophisticated computer tools, has allowed for
exploratory data analysis (EDA) opportunities of large volumes of data for waste, fraud, and abuse
through comparative analysis from provider to provider and market to market.”).
265
See Health Information Technology: A Building Block to Quality Health Care: Hearing Before
the S. Committee on Finance, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (“It would seem
to me that we have an opportunity to push the ‘pause’ button and make sure that the [meaningful use]
program is working before we continue down a potentially unsustainable path.”); Press Release, Senate
Comm. on Fin., Hatch Statement at Finance Committee Hearing Examining How Health Information
Technology Can Improve Health Care Quality (July 17, 2013), available at http://www.finance.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/07%2017%2013%20Hatch%20Opening%20Statement%20on%20Health%20IT%2
0hearing.pdf (same); see also Dan Bowman, Hatch Wants to Pause, Reassess Meaningful Use,
FIERCEEMR (July 18, 2013), http://www.fierceemr.com/story/hatch-wants-pause-reassess-meaningfuluse/2013-07-18 (reporting Senator Hatch’s comments at the Senate Finance Committee hearing,which
expressed his concern as to whether the meaningful use program was actually saving the government
money).
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should never hesitate to view every legislative act related to EHRs as a
double-edged sword: more widespread use of EHRs could create more
exposure to potential medical identity theft via cyberspace; more patient
access to EHRs could lessen physicians’ ability to treat the patient; more
automated data entry features could conceal fraud from prosecutors.
Legislators should address all of these considerations with equal analytical
vigor. Further, state legislators should not assume that Congress ultimately
dictates policy related to EHR fraud. Instead, they should take the initiative
to enact state laws to account for federal law deficiencies. For example,
one section in the Code of Federal Regulations provides that federal
provisions preempt contrary state provisions, except for state provisions
that are “necessary . . . [t]o prevent fraud and abuse related to the provision
of or payment for health care.”266 In essence, this statutory exception grants
state legislators permission to experiment with legislation that addresses a
nationwide policy concern.
Finally, patients should be privy to their health care providers’ actions
as they relate to their EHRs. HIPAA and the HITECH Act pave the way
for more patient access to EHRs through the meaningful use program and
patients should always be wary of inconsistencies or abnormalities in their
EHRs. Further, they should restrict family members’ and friends’ access to
their EHRs, subject to physician recommendations and physical conditions
that require it.267
C. Increase the Scope of Fraud Investigation
The sweeping provisions of the HITECH Act and its HIPAA
modifications suggest that the world of EHRs is becoming more
interwoven. In this light, prosecutors, auditors, and other anti-fraud actors
should adopt a wider perspective in looking at the timeline of protected
health information in electronic format. These anti-fraud actors should also
adopt a wider perspective in looking at the potential parties involved in
fraudulent activity. Specifically, as for looking at the timeline of protected
health information, anti-fraud investigators should be mindful of the spread
of EHR adoption and they should consider the reality that many potential
actors—both good and bad—might have access to EHRs. Therefore, fraud
investigators should rely on audit technology and meticulously follow each
and every transaction—from creation to destruction—involved in the long
life of EHRs. As for looking at potential parties involved in fraud, since the
HITECH Act increased the scope of HIPAA liability for protected health
information breaches to include business associates of covered entities,
266

45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a) (2013).
Such as if the patient is mentally challenged and needs family assistance in evaluating his or
her protected health information.
267
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anti-fraud authorities should track closely the actions of all of these
involved parties to ensure that both covered entities and business
associates are not perpetrating fraud. Anti-fraud authorities should also
stay abreast of all data breach notifications, paying close attention to what
happens to EHRs after they have been accessed, breached, and/or used for
other transactions.
Further, given that the 2009 amendments to the False Claims Act
greatly expanded the scope of liability for submitting false claims for
payment from the government, anti-fraud authorities should look at the
back end of health care transactions and should track suspect health care
providers with increased vigor even after they have billed Medicare or
Medicaid. Thus, as an example, if the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services determine that they have overpaid a particular health care
provider, they should look closely at whether the provider is avoiding
payment to the Centers when they seek reimbursement. In this manner,
anti-fraud authorities can track down all of the various forms of fraud that
afflict the modern U.S. health care industry.
V. CONCLUSION
Physicians and scientists have used EHRs since the 1960s,268 and
EHRs will become increasingly important in the world of health care for
the near future. EHRs provide more comprehensive assessments of a
patient’s health, they save production-related costs, they standardize the
means of communication between disparate providers, and they
exponentially improve the speed at which protected health information
travels.269 However, EHRs present new exposures to fraud and data
breaches. These exposures not only lead to financial losses, but they also
lead to a diminished quality of care. If policymakers, prosecutors, and
providers do not rein in these exposures and do not pierce EHR
technology’s electronic veil covering fraud, then the aims of the HITECH
Act might become meaningless. One author points out the ironic outcome
that EHR technology can manifest, stating that “with technology comes
risk—and for the medical providers that . . . rely upon [EHRs], that risk
may include increased scrutiny, investigation, and even prosecution by the
very government that promoted the switch to [EHRs] in the first place.”270
268
See Robyn Weisman, How EHR Came to Be (or Why Doctors Aren’t Like Airline Pilots),
STORAGECRAFT (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.storagecraft.com/blog/ehr-came-doctors-arent-likeairline-pilots/ (explaining, for example, that Latter Day Saints Hospital in Utah began using software
called Health Evaluation through Logical Programming (HELP) in 1967, which was an early form of
EHR technology).
269
See ROACH, JR. ET AL., note 227, at 440–41 (discussing the core functional characteristics of
EHRs).
270
Robert Radick, EMRs: The New Health Care Fraud Frontier?, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2012, 4:58
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/12/04/emrs-the-new-health-care-fraud-frontier/.
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EHR technology aims to achieve a more coordinated and holistic approach
to health care. We should espouse a holistic approach in analyzing EHR
technology’s effects on the law.

